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A FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF RELIGIONS

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I

Christianity, Buddhism and Islam are the three chief religions into which the majority of mankind is distributed. Very different in beliefs, doctrines and dogmas, they have, nevertheless, some features in common: each of them has a founder from whom it originated, each aims at the salvation of man, each practices proselytism, each addresses itself to every man of every country, of every nationality and of every culture. Even Zoroastrianism, which has but few followers today, and Manichaeism, now a dead religion, have the same characters.

All these religions, characterized as they are by the presence of a founder, by a soteriological ideal, by proselytism, by supernationalism, belong therefore to the same well-defined type which we may call 'modern,' especially on account of the fact that among the religions of this type are, as we have said, the three great *actual* religions of mankind. It is true that among them is even a dead religion, *i.e.*, Manichaeism. On the other hand, chronologically speaking, Buddhism is five hundred years earlier than Christianity, while Zoroastrianism is generally believed to be some centuries older than Buddhism. Therefore, these religions are 'modern,' not in a chronological or existential sense, but in a purely typological one, particularly in

regard to other religions belonging to another type which we may rightly call 'ancient.'

Religions of the latter type are those of the Romans, Greeks, Egyptions, Babylonians, Hittites, Persians, Indians, Chinese, Japanese, Aztecs, etc. These religions had no founder; their origins are lost in obscurity with those of their respective peoples. They bind *all* and *only* the members of a given nation or state. They aim at the preservation and growth of their respective national and political communities rather than at the salvation of each individual in the life to come. They do not practise proselytism, nor do they tend to impose themselves on other peoples and countries. These religions are therefore *negatively* characterized by the absence of those characters appertaining to the religions of the 'modern' type. *Positively* their more salient specific trait is the civic, national, public, political, more or less official character common to them all.

This religious type, so radically different from the 'modern,' is the 'ancient' type of religion. Of course, the term 'ancient' has here a merely typological sense. As a matter of fact this was the type that prevailed in the ancient world, both classic and oriental, but, as among the religions of the 'modern' type there are some no longer in existence today, not all the religions of the 'ancient' type have now ceased to exist. The official religion of China in the form given it and systematized by Confucius about 500 B.C. lasted, at least, until the revolution of 1912, and cannot be said to have entirely died out. Shintoism, the national religion of Japan, is also a religion of the 'ancient' type, but it still lives and offers an exceptional interest for students of religions, because it *actually* represents an archaic religious type, practically extinct.

II

Typology is necessarily abstract, but not so the method which goes beyond the structural or static traits in order to find dynamic traits or *functional* analogies. Christianity and Buddhism have in common such static characters as belong to the 'modern' type of religion, namely supernationalism, proselytism, etc. Generally speaking, *Buddhism represents in the Far East that transition from the 'ancient type' of national religion to the 'modern' one of supernational religion which is represented by Christianity in the West.* This chief *functional* similarity is all the more notable since Buddhism and Christianity are,

as above said, radically different in doctrinal and ideological respects. It shows once more that religion develops on a plan which is not precisely, or at least not only, that of belief or doctrine or dogma, This single aspect, this common function both of Buddhism and Christianity beyond all doctrinal divergence, establishes a dynamic, organic and therefore truly historical parallel between the religious history of the East and that of the West. We shall now follow this parallel more closely.

Christianity, born in Palestine, issued from its birthplace to conquer the West; Buddhism, born in India, started from that country to conquer the East. The expansion of both Christianity and Buddhism took place successively in two different areas, in two different periods and in two different ways.

The first immense field for the penetration of Christianity was the Roman Empire; analogously that of Buddhism was the Chinese Empire. The propagation happened to begin about the same time, but here it is not synchronism, but cultural parallelism that matters. China, an enormous empire of ancient and advanced civilisation corresponds in a certain way in the East to what the Roman Empire was in the West. The diffusion of Christianity in the Graeco-Roman world is mainly due to the religious propaganda which was carried on in the beginning among the lower classes of the population and *then* extended to the higher. Likewise in China, Buddhism found favour among the lowest classes, while it was (together with Taoism) opposed by the highest, the representatives of the official religion (Confucianism).

Buddhism came from China across Korea to Japan in the sixth century A.D. Japan was, at that time, a country of 'barbaric' civilisation largely exposed to the influence of the superior Chinese civilisation.

There was between China and Japan an inequality of historic-cultural level corresponding to that existing between Roman or Romanized Europe and the rest of Europe beyond the confines of the Empire: Celtic, Germanic and Slav. A corresponding change in the manner of propagation, a corresponding curve in the long parallel lines of their functions was created in both Buddhism and Christianity by this change of cultural milieu. The conversion of 'barbarians' to Christianity entered into the complex process of their acculturation within the orbit of Roman (or Byzantine) civilisation, just as the in-

troduction of Buddhism into Japan is one of the many aspects of the penetration of Chinese civilisation. In the previous period the diffusion of Christianity into the Roman world, like that of Buddhism into the Chinese, was the fruit of the spontaneous impulse of an enthusiastic faith, of an apostolic spirit, namely, of purely religious energies. In this second period, on the contrary, secular, cultural and political factors prevailed. The expansive movement did not proceed from the low to the high, but from the high to the low. In barbaric Europe it was generally the rulers and princes who first embraced the religion of Rome (or Byzantium), and their example, or rather, their orders were followed by mass conversions of the population. Similarly in Japan Buddhism made its first proselytes in court circles while most of the people continued for a long time to ignore the new religion.[1]

Nevertheless there is a great difference within the general *functional* parallel we have traced. Buddhism and Christianity have, as is said, the same historico-religious *function*, which is that of creating, respectively in the East and in the West, the new type of supernational religion. But this common task was carried out in different ways by the two religions. In Japan, not only did the people ignore Buddhism for a long time, but also those among the upper classes who embraced the new religion did not repudiate the ancient Shintō, the Japanese national religion, continued to exist alongside Buddhism. And if, since the ninth century, Buddhism finally penetrated among the masses, it was only through a systematic Shintō-Buddhistic syncretism founded on the principle that the *kami* (Shintō deities) were the incarnations of as many Buddhist *hotoke* (Buddhas and Bodhisattvas). Thus Shintoism was able to come down to our time and it was restored in the *Meiji* epoch to the form of the 'pure Shintō,' *i.e.*, to its genuine form, free from its traditional Buddhist incrustations and superstructures. Analogously in China, Buddhism did not succeed in, nor did it aim at, doing away with Taoism or Confucianism, rather it entered into a special relationship with these religions thus rendering it possible for the Chinese to participate in all three together.

[1] A more ample treatment of these points may be found in my papers: *La Mitologia Giapponese*, Bologna, 1929; "Die Nationalreligion Japans und die Religionspolitik des japanischen Staates," *Orient und Occident*, Vol. V (1931), pp. 33-47; *Religione e politica religiosa nel Giappone moderno*, Rome, 1934; "Sincretismo e conversione nelle storia della religioni," *Bulletin du Comité International des Sciences historiques*, Paris, 1933; "Syncretisme et conversion," *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*, 1935.

The process was quite different in the West. There Christianity conducted a struggle without quarter against all religions it encountered in its path, against the Graeco-Roman paganism as well as against the barbarian. Syncretistic tendencies sporadically made their appearance in the history of Christianity, but they were always finally overcome by the totalitarian and exclusive spirit of that religion. In short, it may be said that while *Buddhism in the East allowed the national religions of the various countries wherein it was diffused to survive, Christianity in the West did not permit the various national paganisms to exist as such.* This *functional* difference is for the historian far more important than the doctrinal differences, however profound they may be, between the two religions. Thus the religious history of the East, though sharing the general development of religion from the national (ancient) type to the supernational (modern) type, differs substantially from the religious history of the West.

III

In the interplay of religious forces through which the transition from the religion of the 'ancient' type (paganism) to that of the 'modern' (Christianity) was carried out in the West, the so-called 'mysteries' played a part: Greek, Phrygian, Egyptian, Persian mysteries and the like. Mystery religions present certain features (soteriology, proselytism, and others) which are lacking, as we have seen, in the religions of the 'ancient' type, while they are common to religions of the 'modern.' On the other hand, they differ from the latter chiefly in not being originated by a founder. The origins of the 'mysteries' are lost in the darkness of time. National religions of the 'ancient' type also have very ancient origins. But in the mystery religions we find signs not merely of archaism but of primitivism.[2] Tattooing, which was practised in the Phrygian and Mithraic mysteries, is still widely used among primitive peoples, ancient and modern.[3] The rhombos, which according to the evidence of Archytas and of a scholium to Clemens Alexandrinus was employed in the Orphic mysteries, corresponds in form and use to similar instruments of the Austrialians, Melanesians, North-Americans, Africans, etc., which are used especial-

[2] This and other points here touched upon are developed in my book, *I misteri*, Bologna, 1924.

[3] Evidence and literature in my *Confessione dei peccati*, III, Bologna, 1936, pp. 37-38, n. 90.

ly in the initiation of youths.[4] In the Mithraic mysteries the initiated of certain degrees (*corax, leo*) disguised themselves as animals (crows, lions), imitating their cries,—and it is known that in the initiatory and totemic rites of primitive peoples (Australians and others) the animal disguise of the participants plays a great part. Here must also be added the crude sexual naturalism common to the mysteries of Eleusis, of Sabazios, of Attis, etc., which is met with equally in the religion of primitive peoples.

These primitive features which accompanied the mysteries throughout the course of their millenarian history, are, it seems, the residue and survival of primitive cultural phases to which therefore the formation of the mysteries themselves probably goes back. Likewise in the mythology of the 'mysteries' are found not a few survivals of primitive thought and belief. There is, therefore, a pre-history of the mysteries. Perhaps they are typologically as well as genetically connected with those rites involving rudimentary exotericism (separation of the sexes) which in primitive communities serve to take young men from the society of women and introduce them into that of male adults.[5]

This is why the mysteries have a place apart in the religious history of the ancient world. They are representatives of a different religious type, very archaic and prior to the formation of national political communities in the ancient world: a type which we may therefore call pre-ancient. The mysteries are pre-ancient, pre-national religious forms, surviving within the national societies of the ancient world, but hermetically sealed from them. Therefore they appear nationally differentiated. But their nationalism is illusive, it is not an organic character but an acquired one. The mystery religions usually live on the margin of the dominant religious life of a nation: relegated to the shade in the culminating epochs of national history, they emerge again when a nation declines and the state is dismantled. So the oriental mysteries reached their culminating point in the Hellenistic epoch after the conquest by Alexander the Great of the independent national states to which they belonged.

But equally illusive is the supernationalism of the mysteries, which seems to link them to the religions of the modern type. The latter are genuinely supernational, while the mysteries are pre-national. It is

[4] *I misteri*, pp. 19-22.
[5] H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, New York, 1932.

in a merely negative way, that is, in their non-nationalism (though they are different even in this), that the mysteries resemble modern religions; from the latter, on the contrary, the mysteries differ profoundly (as has been said) in that they do not have founders.

Christianity, however, has been considered a mystery, namely the Judaic mystery of Christus similar to the Phrygian mystery of Attis, the Egyptian mystery of Osiris, the Persian mystery of Mithra.[6] But against the formula 'Judaic mystery' one may object that Christianity as long as it was Judaic was not a mystery and when it became a mystery was no longer Judaic. Moreover the identification of Christianity as a mystery, justified as it is by the undeniable resemblances between Christianity and the mysteries, should not obscure the differences. These are not only of a structural but also of a *functional* nature, as I now intend to show.

In 186 B.C. Roman Italy was convulsed by a religious movement that had arisen some years before in the south and spread rapidly from one end of the peninsula to the other; from Etruria it penetrated Rome and was violently suppressed by the Roman state. This was the movement of the so-called Bacchanalia.

Livy (lib. 39, cap. 8-19) describes this strange episode of religious intolerance. A copy of the edict has also come down to us engraved on a bronze tablet found in Calabria (CIL I. 196) giving the oppressive measures taken by the Senate and sent throughout Italy to break up the movement. Seven thousand persons, men and women, were condemned and, most of them, put to death.[7] The Roman Senate saw a political menace in the Bacchanalia. This was an exaggerated estimate of its immediate possibilities and a lack of appreciation of its essentially religious character. The adherents were bound by an oath not to declared to extraneous persons the secrets of the cult: but this did not make them conspirators. The suppression, however unjustified as it was in its immediate motives, evidenced, nevertheless, an exceptional political intuition. The Bacchanalian enthusiasm was in fact a religious movement, but of a quite special character which rendered it potential-

[6] *Cf.* A. Loisy, *Les mystères païens et le mystère chrétien*, Paris, 1930.

[7] F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, Paris, 1929, pp. 196 ff.; Ed. Fränkel, "Senatusconsultum de Bacchanalibus", *Hermes*, 1932, pp. 369 ff.; R. Reitzenstein, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XIX (1916-1919), pp. 191 ff.; T. Frank, "The Bacchanalian Cult of 186 B.C.," *The Classical Quarterly*, 1927, pp. 128 ff.

ly dangerous; the religion of the Bacchanalia was profoundly different from that of the Roman State and in this difference lay a source of conflict.

The Bacchanalia with their rites of initiation, their morbid experiences, their hopes of salvation, their proselytical propaganda, belonged to the type of mystery religions; they were essentially akin to the mysteries of Sabazios, Attis and others. The Roman religion, quite dominated by the idea of the State, obligatory for all citizens and for them only, indifferent to the destiny of man beyond this world, was a religion typically civic, public and political, like the others prevailing in the ancient world. The conflict between the Roman State and the Bacchanalia was an episode in the divergent aims of two essentially different types of religion. In the history of the religions of mankind the names handed down to us by Livy of those obscure men who were at the head of the movement stand in big letters: M. and C. Atinius, plebeians of Rome, L. Opiternius of Faleri, Minius Cerrinius of Campania. One can not read the few words of Livy (lib. 39, cap. 17) without emotion: *adducti ad consules fassique de se nullam moram indicio*[8] *fecerunt*. They confess and without opposition they serenely accept the sentence. They do not feel themselves guilty. A grand word spontaneously comes to our lips: martyrs! Or should we scruple to use this word *ante literam* for the leaders of a movement which has passed into history with a stigma of infamy? But this stigma was impressed by their persecutors, and the persecutors were the same by whom the Christian martyrs likewise were vituperated and accused of turpitude. Victims they certainly were, victims of a conflict greater than themselves since it was the age-old secular conflict between the religion and salvation of the State and the religion and salvation of man. This is the profound historical and *functional* meaning of the conflict itself, this is its transcendental political value and therefore, also, its justification.

The episode was not an isolated one. It formed, on the contrary, the juridical precedent for the intervention of the Roman State in other religions.[9] The Jews who were expelled from Rome in 139 A.D. were Jews of the *diaspora*, and the motive of expulsion was their cult of

[8] This, in my opinion, is the correct rendering, instead of *indico*; cf. 39: 18, 2 and 19, 2.

[9] R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig, 1927, pp. 101 ff.

Jupiter Sabazios, to which certainly the elements of a Dionysiac mystery religiosity were not foreign. It was then the turn of the Egyptian mysteries; after being hindered in the last decades of the Republic and again under Augustus, they suffered a ferocious persecution under Tiberius. In this case, too, as in that of the Jews, and in that of the Bacchanalia, reasons of public morality were alleged. But what appeared scandalous to the Romans and sometimes actually degenerated into scandal was an essential part of these mystery religions, of their cult, of their rites and of their beliefs.

Then another religion began to experience the intolerance of the Roman State. The Emperor Claudius had ordered the Jews to be banished from Rome because they were "making tumults through the instigation of a certain Chrestos."[10] These were probably dissident Jews who had embraced the Christian faith. Under Nero the Christians were already persecuted as such. Almost inadvertently Christianity inserted itself in the pre-existent conflict, and the juridical precedent already used against the mystery religions was likewise applied to the Christian religion.

Is this not then a sign—a sign of a *functional* kind—which, when added to others of a structural kind, confirms the essential affinity of Christianity and the mystery religions? Apparently yes. But in reality the mysteries and Christianity were typologically different. As from a structural point of view the presence of certain common characters does not nullify the substantial difference between the pre-ancient and pre-national type represented by the mysteries and the modern and supernational type of Christianity, so from the *functional* point of view the common oppression on the part of another religion like the Roman, a religion of the ancient and national type, indicates a purely negative similarity. In fact, this situation was only temporary and ended in giving place to another, wherein the mysteries and Christianity appear *functionally* and definitively differentiated.

After the policy of oppression followed a policy of attraction on the part of the Roman State. This succeeded with the mysteries but not with Christianity. The Roman religion was thus able to impose itself on the mystery religions, but Christianity ended by imposing itself on both the Roman religion and on the mysteries. The admis-

[10] Suetonius, *Claud.*, 25: "Judaeos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes, Roma expulit"; *cf. Act. Apost.* 18, 2.

sion of Roman citizens to the Phrygian mysteries of Attis (*Attis populi Romani* CIL 6. 2183), the *taurobolia* celebrated *pro salute imperii* (CIL 2. 5521), *pro salute imperatoris* (CIL 14. 40), the *sacra Isidos* introduced by Caracalla in the new temple on the Quirinal, *i.e.*, into the very heart of Rome, within the *pomoerium* (Ael. Spart., *Carac.* 9. 10), the sanctuary dedicated 307 A.D at Carnuntum by Diocletian and by the other Augusti and Caesars *Deo Soli invicto Mithrae fautori imperii sui* (CIL 3. 4413) were the progressive signs of the conciliation of Rome with the mystery religions.

The day of conciliation also dawned for Christianity, in the year 313, with the edict of Milan. Once more it seems that the destiny of Christianity conforms to that of the mysteries. But on the contrary, a profound difference is here revealed. Having obtained recognition, the mystery religions found themselves in a subordinate position over against the official religion of the Roman State, the same position which they had already maintained over against the respective national religions in their original countries, Persia, Egypt, Greece, etc. Owing to their *original* pre-national character they were unable to become the national religions of their respective countries, so on account of the *acquired* national character (acquired in the long centuries of marginal survival within their respective national milieu) none of them could become the national religion of a supernational state such as the Roman Empire. According to Renan, if Christianity had not existed the world would have become Mithraic. I do not think so. Mithraism had remained too Persian to become the religion of Rome.

It was Christianity, a typically supernational religion, that became the religion of Rome. The situation created by the edict of Milan did not last long. With Constantine Christianity had become *one* of the religions recognized by the state; with Theodosius (378-395 A.D.) it became the *sole* religion recognized by the state. A group of Roman inscriptions dedicated about the time of Theodosius are of the greatest interest in this connection. The dedicators (CIL 6. 499 *sqq.*) were personages of the highest Roman aristocracy, who united in their persons the highest offices of the Roman traditional and official religion (*pontifices, augures publici, quindecemviri sacris faciundis*) with the supreme degrees in the hierarchy of the various mysteries (*patres* and *hieroceryces* of Mithra, *sacerdotes* of Isis, *hiero-*

fantae of Hecate, *archibucoli* of Liber, etc.). Here we see at close range the radical change that had occurred. Here the Roman religion and the mystery religions, formerly adversaries, appear associated in a last vain stand against triumphant Christianity. The situation is now completely reversed and the relations between the three religious types at work are completely changed. Now it is Christianity that persecutes both the Roman religion and the mysteries. This is the most evident *functional* sign of the profound essential difference between the mysteries and Christianity. Their destinies now diverge quite clearly and Christianity appears to us in its specific *function,* which is that of opposing itself to both the pre-ancient and ancient religions so as to introduce 'modern' religion to the West.

The advent of modern religion in the West took place, as we said, not as it did in the East, but through the total disappearance of ancient religion as such. The ancient Roman religion disappeared, but with it also ancient Rome came to an end, incredible as that seemed.

Christianity is a religion of salvation, the salvation of man—of every man—in the other life, in another world, in relation to which this world of ours has a secondary value. Earthly life is an ephemeral pathway that man must travel with his eyes continually fixed on the goal, *i.e.,* the life beyond, the future life. This earthly life does not merit being lived, it merits rather to be lost, so that future life may be gained, this life is subordinate to the other life, the world to the super-world, the society of men to the society of saints. The Roman religion, on the contrary, was turned towards *this* world. It too had, however, a task of salvation. But what had to be saved was in the first place the life of the community and of the state, a life that transcended that of each individual, but was nevertheless a life of *this* world. The salvation of man as an individual passed into the background; it was conditioned by and subordinated to the salvation of the country. The individual had to sacrifice himself for the country. The Roman religion was itself a religion of sacrifice, but of sacrifice for an object that is of this world.

In this religion Rome had grown and had conquered the world. And now she repudiated this, *i.e.,* her own religion and adopted another, *i.e.,* the Christian, whose spirit was totally extraneous to hers. True it is that Rome has become an Empire, a supernational state, which, as such, had need of a supernational religion suitable to realize the reli-

gious unification of all peoples. This had been for centuries the great problem of the Roman religious policy and had already received various solutions, but in all the solutions so far given either by Emperor worship or by the religion of the Sun, Rome had always preserved, alongside the new forms, the precious patrimony of her ancient religion handed down from the remotest times, bequeathed by the Republic to the Empire, restored by Augustus, inadequate, to be sure, to the imperial task, but always venerable and glorious. Such a coexistence was not possible with Christianity. When the supernational Roman Empire adopted Christianity—a supernational religion—for the solution of the century-old problem of its religious unity, it had to sacrifice its own traditional religion. That day marked the death of the ancient gods, but on that day the Roman Empire also died. What remained was but a shadow of it. There remained the enormous scaffolding, the great administrative machine, the gigantic structure of oecumenical organization. But the ancient spirit of Rome had vanished. In those ancient forms a new spirit had replaced it. The Empire still grew, spiritually, tending to embrace the whole earth; but it was no longer an empire of *this* world. It was raised from earth to heaven. It was no longer the Empire; it was the Church. No longer the *res republica*, it was the *civitas Dei*.

Many and varied religious elements of pre-ancient origin have survived in the ancient religions, and thence passed into the modern ones. Among them the mysteries are perhaps the most organized and typologically best defined forms. But they are not, the mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman epoch, the only representatives of this pre-ancient religious type. In other places and times appear other *mysteroid* formations,[11] akin to the mysteries and likewise of a primitive origin, but not so completely developed. Traces of them are found in the ancient Babylonian culture-area.[12] And also in Tantrism[13] and

[11] *Cf. I misteri*, pp. 282 ff.

[12] *Cf.* H. Zimmern, "Babylonische Vorstufen der vorderasiatischen Mysterien-religionen," *Zeit. der deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 1922, pp. 36 ff.

[13] A symptom of the actual orientation of studies in this direction may be seen in a recent book of Mircea Eliade, *Yoga: Essai sur les origines de la mystique indienne*, Paris and Bucharest, 1936: "Dans cet ouvrage (one reads in the preface) nous nous proposons . . . d'envisager le phénomène *Yoga* au point de vue de l'histoire des religions. . . . Nous essayons de prouver que le *yoga*, loin d'être le patrimoine de quelques sectes ascétiques, est une catégorie spécifique de l'esprit indien, ayant une histoire ininterrompé du Chalcolithique jusqu'à nos jours. . . . Nous constatons que les

Hinduism, in Chinese Taoism, in *Shuā Shintō, i.e.*, the "sectarian" Shintō of Japan, one perceives the presence of some elements of a pre-ancient mystery type. The individuation of these elements, the determination of their respective *functions* within the various religious systems in the East is a magnificent field open to the student of religions.

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pratiques *yoga* satisfont toujours la tendence populaire, pré-aryenne, autochtone, vers le concret. . . . En présentant une hypothèse sur les origines de ces pratiques, nous nous sommes proposé de prouver qu'elles peuvent parfaitement s'encadrer dans la civilisation proto-historique de Mohenjo-Daro."

ŚAṂKARA AND THE HINDU ONE

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The American philosophical horizon has long included such Indian elements as the Upanishads, the Vedānta, and Śaṁkara. Not only have these "philosophic" treatises, this "system" of philosophy, and this philosopher been intimately associated in western expositions of Indian thought; they have been identified as three several but mutually agreeable representations of consistent Indian idealism. A tradition based upon this view has established itself in western lecture-halls and has determined in most cases the form of reference to Hindu philosophic speculation. It makes Hindu thought predominantly, if not entirely, something known as "monistic or absolute idealism." An American review of religion may properly serve both India and the West by scrutinizing this tradition, by re-examining its major implications. Are these well-known elements synonymous? Is Indian philosophy some sort of thoroughgoing idealism? Is Śaṁkara a "monist" and a true expounder of Vedānta and the Upanishads? If the Vedānta is Upanishadic, are the Upanishads Vedāntic?

Our western interpretation of India's thought and institutions seems, indeed, to have achieved a stereotype, and that, too, in the absence of many factors essential to final judgment. We have too readily considered her ideas apart from their full cultural setting, even apart from the thinkers themselves, as if they, too, were negligible. Śaṁkara, for example, has not been to us a living person in an actual situation. We have not considered for what it was worth the fact that his era, *c.* 550-900 A.D., was for Hinduism mainly one of theistic Śākta systems (goddess-cults) and sectarian Upanishads. Much has been wanting from the total picture. English universities have been accused of teaching ignorance of India! An American Indologist of good repute reminded many of us a decade ago of "some misunderstandings about India," including our common impression that Hindus have lead "an exclusively spiritual life in which attachment to worldly activity was reduced to a minimum."[1] Having learned

[1] W. E. Clark, in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Sept., 1926, pp. 193-201.

about India mainly through the only early Indian literature which was preserved, and which was almost entirely religious, we are still generally unfamiliar with an even larger store of sources on which we must depend for the full perspective. In India least of all may thoughts be weighed without the thinker, may institutions be accounted for on narrow grounds, and speculation traced without its setting in the total flow.

Deliberately to limit our review, we may properly lay emphasis upon India's best known thinker, Śaṁkara, in relation to the Vedānta and the original Upanishads. We shall hold thus one straw in the wind, as an Upanishadic figure has it—risking Agni's burning it or Vayu's bearing it away.[2] We might, as a challenge, call our straw, our theme, the subject of our inquiry, the *pluralistic one* of Hindu, even Śaṁkarite, philosophy. The challenge is to all who hold and expound the tradition that Śaṁkara, the Vedānta, and the Upanishads are all "monistic" (*i.e.*, examples of monistic idealism exclusively).

The Vedānta has generally, of late, been called "monistic"; and "the Vedānta philosophy" is a common phrase.[3] Śaṁkara's Vedānta, the *advaitavāda*, is called "pure monism."[4] Now the term Vedānta covers nothing uniform. There are, in fact, several major types of this philosophy. The word, which means "the Veda's end," may be found in the third century, B.C. in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* vi, 22, a basic source for the modified Vedāntic philosophy of the twelfth century, A.D., Rāmānuja! Paul Deussen himself, who is largely responsible for our monistic view,[5] of Indian thought, was among those who discovered long ago the variations of Vedānta. He once estimated that among one hundred "Vedāntists" there were 15 Rāmānujists, 5 Mādhavists, 5 Vallabhāchāris, and 75 followers of Śaṁkara. This was merely an estimate, there being no census figures to rely on at the time. Although we cannot count the Śaṁkarites exactly, even through a census of their *maṭhs*, or monasteries, we may be certain that they preponderate among Vedāntists. But, if we consider Hinduism as a

[2] *Cf. Kena Upaniṣad.*

[3] *Cf.* F. Yeats-Brown, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1936, p. 444.

[4] J. N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*, Oxford, 1920, *Cf.* p. 171.

[5] It was a thesis of his that "monism is the natural standpoint of philosophy, and wherever dualism has appeared in its history it has always been the consequence of antecedent stress and difficulty." Paul Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 244.

whole, or even Hindu thought as such, we may not give Vedāntism a preponderance. On the contrary, it represents a minor phase of thought. India is and has been largely realistic. Even among so-called Vedāntists there are realists in great numbers. The Hindu, on the whole, has lived in the world obedient therein to whatever claims his station laid upon him. Nor has Indian asceticism—and the spirit of renunciation has been strong in India—been wholly idealistic. It has rested on a dualistic, rather than monistic, basis, for the ascetic sought escape from a real, not an unreal, world.

Perhaps three fourths of Hindu thinkers between 800 and 1000 A.D. were "vedāntic." Perhaps they then were mainly idealistic. And Śaṁkara (d. 828 or 850 A.D.) was, without doubt, the greatest thinker and idealist of them all. Whatever idealism there is in Hinduism is best represented by him. But he may not—in fact, did not—claim the whole field for himself. Looking at the total sweep of Hindu thought, both before his day and since, we may conclude with reason that it is largely realistic. If, indeed, we take all Hindus into view, both common men and thinkers, we need not hesitate to say that India is as much as ninety per cent realistic (we use the term as yet but loosely). Hindus have been, in fact, more religious than philosophical. They have had theology, but no philosophy strictly so called. Their religion, without question, has been realistic; their theology, mostly so. Consider the literary sources with which the West has been somewhat familiar. Even they, rightly used, prevent us from holding the position which we formerly held at the bidding of selective interpretation. There are linked together, in long tradition, the Vedas, especially as "collected" (*i.e.*, the Saṁhitas), and including the Brāhmaṇas, or "priestly" treatises; the Upanishads, especially the "thirteen," though including others to the number of sixty and even one hundred and fifty; the "*Vedānta-sūtras* of Bādarāyana" who, with others, theorized on Brahman, the breath or spirit, embodied in the universe; the metrical *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, with several commentaries which he wrote; the Commentary (*Bhāṣya*) of Śaṁkara on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, with other major works of his; and Sadānanda's post-Islamic (seventeenth century) *Vedānta-sāra*,[6] a handy digest or short-cut to Śaṁkara's bulky *Bhāṣya* and Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtras*. To

[6] There is good reason to suspect that the "Vedānta" actually current in later times among the villages of India, whence the impression of wide-spread idealism, was that of the somewhat contaminated *Vedānta-sāra*.

these we may add the Commentaries of Mādhava and of Rāmānuja, if we desire the whole so-called "vedāntic" line of speculation. True, the Vedāntic strain runs unbroken through them all. Yet what if the term Vedānta covers nothing uniform? Within this very line are realistic, dualistic, elements in great abundance. And if we take the larger view which, nevertheless, includes the specialized tradition, we find some such development as this of India's theology: Vedic naturism, especially of the atmosphere and sky, with many potent deities, and with tendencies toward the setting up of One Supreme; naturalistic pluralism, with many "lower" powers vying with the higher gods (our literary tradition has here, perhaps, distorted slightly the true perspective of development) and with, now and then, "monistic" tendencies and issues; dualisms of many sorts, such as the Hindu Sāṁkhya, the Jainism of Mahāvīra and the Way of Buddha, against all of which "Vedānta," once arisen, issued warnings and launched counter-movements;[7] an idealistic era shared by many groups, which certain later Buddhists, including Aśvaghoṣa and Asaṅga, possibly carried farthest; popular and persistent polytheism, concurrent with the higher speculation, and with implications of a pluralistic theory affecting every thinker; the attempt of Śaṁkara, himself the heir of what he deemed the best in higher Hindu orthodoxy, serving to reconstruct a dominating system of theology (and, may we say, philosophy?); and subsequent Vedāntists of all sorts, amidst the great majority of theists and, in particular, including Hindu converts to Islam.

Now Śaṁkara stands within the broad Vedic-Upanishadic-Vedāntic stream. Or, if it were not unfortunate to do so, we might say merely within the broad Vedāntic stream. Unfortunately, while Vedānta means the "end of wisdom" (*veda*), it has been applied, even by Hindus themselves, unwisely to certain kinds of idealistic wisdom. It were quite as valid to say Vedāntic realism. But the burden of our present inquiry, the test of Hindu idealism, is this, was Śaṁkara a monist, is his Vedānta strict monism, and, incidentally, may we continue to declare, as we habitually have done in western class-rooms, that "the philosophy of the Upanishads is absolute idealism?"[8]

Was Śaṁkara a monist? Or, to improvise with as much right an

[7] In the Indian sequence monism followed dualism. Deussen's remark is historically inaccurate, that idealistic "Vedānta was distorted into Sāṁkhya" dualism.

[8] We are aware that "monism" is a westerner's invention. We use it loosely, along with other general philosophic terms, merely to indicate at once the aspects of our inquiry, particularly our review of Indian Idealism.

Indian equivalent, was he an ekyist (from *eka,* "one"). That he sought to establish "the absolute unity of the self" is beyond question, but that he conceived of all Reality as One may be disputed. He called Reality not *eka,* "one," but *advaita,* "non-duality." His *Bhāṣya* opens with this observation, however: It is a matter not requiring any proof that the 'Thou' and the 'I' cannot be identified, nor may the qualities of the one and of the other be identified; the two entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes are distinct; to identify them is to couple the real intelligent self and the non-real objects known only through wrong knowledge, or *avidya.* The motive of his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras* is to free the self of wrong notions which cause evil and to obtain the knowledge of Brahman, or to show that the embodied self, as in the individual, is one with Brahman. As he says, "the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as *avidya,* 'nescience or ignorance,' the seed of the entire Saṁsāra, 'world.' "

These introductory observations in connection with his *mīmāṁsā,* or "inquiry" into the Vedānta (n.b.) portions of the *Veda* tend to indicate something less than absolute idealism. They leave, although it be unaccounted for, something virtually real beyond (or beneath) the scope of the self and Brahman, something, indeed, which constitutes the "non-self." True, he accepts, introduces and relies upon the doctrine of *māyā,* or "illusion," as his argument proceeds, in order to resolve this residue. Yet even in his own systematization of the vedāntic materials the non-self (or, we may say, the *saṁsāra,* "world") becomes illusory only from the point of view of *vidyā,* "knowledge." The world is not actually, but philosophically, the realm of *māyā.* And his choice of a word by which to designate his system must have had more than mere passing significance, must have stood for some difference between an absolute idealism of unqualified proportions and what he was actually formulating. At liberty to use *eka, aikya, ekavāda, etc.,* putting into these his own construction, he called his theory *advaitavāda,* "non-duality"—a designation, by the way, which had been much used by Gauḍapāda before him. He used *eka* and its combinations, to be sure, but with great caution. Perhaps our final judgment should wait upon a thorough examination of his every use

of *eka, etc.* (and some of Śaṁkara's writings are still inaccessible!), but we may suspect that these terms probably had for him unduly pluralistic connotations.

We have already indicated that early Vedic literature contains foregleams of monotheism and of monism. There appeared no leader to carry the former to fruition. The fruitage of the latter was born at last in Śaṁkara—but with theistic qualities inherent in the One. Terms for one and oneness were available to Śaṁkara. There were, for example, the Rigvedic *viśvam ekam,* meaning something of integral multiplicity, "the many that are one, the one that is manifold," and *idam ekam,* "this or that one," *ekaṁ sat,* "the one reality," and *eka ekam,* "the one of the one, the only one." But Vedic *eka* was often used as "one of two or more," and (in the combination *eka . . . eka*) as "the one . . . the other." Even in the speculative portions it was often personal; for instance, "the one [who was "without a second"] breathed, breathless" (RV, X, cxxix, 2); Prajāpati, the first Being, "the one life of the gods," is said to be "God supreme over the gods" (X, cxxi, 6, 7, *devānām . . . ásur ékaḥ . . . devéṣv ádhi devá ékah*); and Puruṣa, the first Person, is the one from whom, by his own sacrifice and vivisection, the many issued—issued really, not apparently (X, 90).

We may also suppose that there were Upanishadic references no less available (and embarrassing?) to Śaṁkara; for example, *eka, ekatā, ekatva, ekātman,* or *aikya* for "one, oneness, oneness of self, unity."[9] While in themselves they may have been susceptible of monistic implications, they mingle in the general context with qualifying observations. Such is the case even with the remarkable *ekam evādvitīyam,* "the non-dualistic one," which had existed "in the beginning" (*Chāndogya* VI, ii, 1-2—of which "beginning" we are not sure, yet Hindu thought has abhorred initial vacuity). This "one" mingled in a confusion of elements, including gods, the one god, creators, and an Absolute. Furthermore, Upanishadic dualists used *eka*-combinations in a pluralistic sense, and worried the monists, especially at the point of the latters' assumption of a One without diversity. As monists multiplied, they vigorously protested and warned against prevailing Upanishadic dualism, against *dvi, dvaita, dvaibhāvya*—in short,

[9] While Śaṁkara, at times, makes use of, *e.g., eka* (*Kāthaka,* v, 15, he apparently ignores other *eka*-passages, *e.g., Bṛhadāraṇyaka,* I, iv, 17; *Aitareya,* i, 1.

dvaitavāda, the then prevalent pluralistic philosophy. But they did not resort to *eka*-combinations in rebuttal. They called themselves "non-dualists."

Śaṁkara is not an ekyist, but an advaitist, and that with special reference to the relation of the self and Brahman—the *ātman* and *Brahman* are one. He was a conspicuous controversialist, his method that of refutation.[10] It were unfair, however, to depend on etymology (that of *a-dvaita*), and for that reason to declare his method solely negative. He accepted, and confirmed by his own exposition, the "great passages" of *advaitvāda*, namely, "that art thou" (*tat tvam asi*), "the one without a second" (*ekam evādvitīyam*) and "all this is Brahman" (*sarvam khalv idam brahmā*). He used many terms having an apparently positive intention, such as *cit* (pure consciousness), *sat* (pure being) and *ānanda* (pure bliss). But, nevertheless, his exposition suffers inevitably through the method of negation. For him *ānanda* meant the absence of sorrow; and *sat* and *cit* were likewise abstractions. And the Brahman at which he finally arrives is unknowable (*cf. Kena Upan.*, i, 1-8). Even at times of mystic insight, doubtless aided by mysterious *māyā*, he knew nothing of the One except its abstract oneness. He insisted that "the Real is attained when the unreal is refuted"—refused, or resolved (dissolved?) away. Yet, for specific reasons, he was careful to avoid a Void. For there were idealistic Buddhists, the Śūnyavādins, who seemed to predicate a void. Was he aware of them, indeed in debate with them, when he surprisingly proclaims that "external things exist . . . because we are conscious of them"? Did he really misunderstand the idealism of certain Buddhists and thus refute them? Or, did he oppose them because they were not orthodox? With some of them, of course, he could not argue, that is, with those who denied the very existence or reality of negation. Even with other opponents who admitted that the affirmation of the negative was authentic, he could succeed in establishing nothing more real than they themselves arrived at.[11] He denied duality, and there were hosts of dualists to oppose, including Jains, Buddhists, and especially Hindu Sāṁkhyists.

[10] "Refutation" is here used in our western sense, for the moment, not in the sense of *apavāda*, "withdrawal," *i.e.*, the recognition of Reality withdrawn from the unreal which, through *avidyā*, "ignorance," envelops the Real.

[11] The "logicians" of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika school insisted that non-existence (*abhava*) could generate cognition, even the negative "is not."

As an advaitist, he ran great risks amidst the dualists—it was difficult to make admissions in the face of many kinds of adversaries, ranging from explicit dualists to proponents of an All which amounted virtually to Nothing! He seemed unwilling even to affirm what his opponents might assent to as tenets of their own. In any case, he was the great defender-advocate of what he thought was orthodoxy in contrast with so many harmful heresies. This office cannot of itself explain his point of view; it does not interpret *advaita*. However, his point of view is better understood when seen in its proper setting. Śaṁkara, without doubt, was somewhat the creature of his times. That he was also affected by the long stream of vedāntic tradition, of which he was the heir may likewise be shown. He did not stand "on his own legs" entirely, "needing neither a before nor an after,"—to quote the words of a noted Hindu's contestable claim of independence for Indian philosophy.[12] This is not to intimate in any sense that Śaṁkara is less worthy than ever of our attention. To review him and his work is to find him still thorough and profound, and it the finest contribution which Indian thought has made to our philosophy. We may, however, in review, find a slightly new perspective and shift a bit our point of vantage with reference to the Indian scene.

While advaitism by its method of negation left its advocates, including Śaṁkara, at a slight remove from the fully Known,[13] its method of interpretation of its literary source materials neglected or else blurred the greater part of them. Śaṁkara, while commenting upon the *Vedānta-sūtras*, professed thereby to be interpreting the Upanishads! It is still an open question as to how close he was in agreement with the *sūtras*. It is not always easy to find the authentic textual ground of Śaṁkara's Commentary. The Upanishadic tradition as it came to him had varied. It is fair to say, with Radhakrishnan,[14] that "he insists on interpreting the Upanishads in a single, coherent manner," but with the further observation that his use of these materials was selective. Although the Upanishads—all of these authentic writings which he knew—were to him *Śruti*, or "revelation," he

[12] *Cf.* S. Radhakrishnan, *The Vedanta*, London, 1928, p. 12.

[13] Perhaps the climax of the method is Yājñavalkya's *neti, neti*, "not this nor that," of *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upan.* IV, v, 15. But the reference is to the real soul (*ātman*) which is "neither this nor that," and it may be doubted whether Yājñavalkya was an absolute idealist.

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

nevertheless stresses their *mahāvākyas*, or "great passages," which emphasize *advaita*. If he had deliberately and independently dealt entirely and objectively with the great passages of his choice—disregarding orthodoxy's "revelation" doctrine—he might have formulated a more significant, positive, and consistent philosophy. He, however, as the total situation lies, was more a theologian than a philosopher. His sources were religious. He was not, at least, as western philosophers have been, in quest of knowledge as an end. Rather he sought a Way of knowledge unto Life. He sought knowledge as the means of *mokṣha*, "liberation," of the breaking of the round of births, and of peaceful death. His was not exclusively an intellectual quest, but the apprehension of the Brahman enshrined within the Vedic-Upanishadic *śāstras*, "scriptures," which to him were *nitya*, or "eternal." He might have said, although the passage has *deva* and not *Brahman*, that "by knowing God one is released from all fetters."[15]

Nor are the Upanishads, strictly speaking, pure philosophy. They are a knowledge-way to Liberation. They require of Hindus wisdom and not sacrifice. However philosophical they be, they offer no one system. They are not, one and all, treatises on monistic, absolute idealism. The Upanishadic Real is sometimes a substance, sometimes a force, sometimes the supreme value, often Brahman. Its problems include the individual, his relation to the Ultimate, the nature of immortality, the character and function of appearance, the proper norm of human conduct, time, space, life, and God. All of these are knowledge problems. Their "philosophy" is varied: the Real is one, multiplicity is real, or there are two eternal substances or values. They are full of Sāṁkhya dualism, even the older treatises. They may, indeed, have prepared the way, as Oldenberg has claimed, for dualistic Buddhism. Dualistic Yoga is there, and, as we have said, Vedānta also. Prajāpati, lord of creation, the personal Puruṣa, primordial darkness (*tamas*), Agni, Vāyu, Rudra, Viṣṇu, the lord Iśāna (*cf.* Śaṁkara's Iśvara) and the mighty lord Maheśvara, all are there, each playing his own role, along with foregleams of cosmic, psychological, and philosophical Unity.

Dependent, by his own admission, upon his revealed sources, Śaṁkara was reduced now and then to interpretation at his pleasure. He was, furthermore, forced to make denials which his sources could not

[15] *Śvetāśvatara Upan.*, iv, 16.

grant, for they take for granted the existence of the Vedic gods. Whereas they themselves sought the One by quest and demonstration, he, their commentator, found it by assumption.[16] While devoted to these treatises as revelation, he sometimes claimed to test them out by reason.[17] Once he identified as Brahman the "one" (*idam*) which a passage (Kāṭhaka iv, 11) declares may be known "by mind alone." And yet he once admitted that Brahman was "without parts (*akhanda*) just because Scripture reveals it."[18] This can but mean, for one thing, that he knew a place for "faith" (*śraddhā*) within Revelation.[19] He exhibits the inconsistencies of his sources. At least, it may not be said that he resolved completely all their inconsistencies. Perhaps the most significant point at which he failed was his inconclusive treatment of Íśvara and the Brahman. Or, we might say that he did not wholly reconcile the Upanishadic conflict of reason and religion.[20] His final recourse in the attainment of the unknown Brahman seems to have been more mystical than rational—mystical upon the variegated basis of tradition!

We have tried, in brief, no refutation of Śaṁkara's Vedānta, but only a reappraisal of our common view of him. We hesitate to label him a monist or his system absolute idealism. There must be, in view of all the facts, some alternative. It is at least suggestive that he used the term *advaita*, "non-dualism," that he did not claim to know the Absolute, that he seems to leave a residue even after the identity of the self and Brahman, that *māyā* seems inadequate to dissolve all unreality, that he commits himself to eternal sources in the Upanishads, that he is devoted to religion and worships God. Incidentally, we learn that he did not reduce the whole world of nature and of persons entirely to illusion, that he represents one strain only of the Vedic-Upanishadic tradition, that the Upanishads offer no consistent philoso-

[16] They arrived at the "breath" (*ātman*) of the universe by induction from the breath of man. Their Unity was not abstract; at least they viewed it realistically, their unitary world-ground.

[17] The Upanishads themselves are inconsistent on this point. *Cf.* "By the mind alone is It to be perceived" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV, iv, 19) and "not by mind . . . can He be apprehended" (*Kāṭhaka* vi, 12).

[18] *Bhāṣya* (S.B.E. XXXIV, pt. 1, p. 350).

[19] *Cf. Kāṭhaka* VI, xii, 13, wherein it is intimated that only a man with faith can truly apprehend the Brahman.

[20] Śaṁkara seems scarcely entitled to a place beside, for example, the Christian Thomas Aquinas, the Jewish Maymun (Maimonides), or the Moslem al-Ashari as a reconciler of reason and religion.

phy of things, that Hindus are and have always been more realistic than we have commonly supposed.

Westerners first learned of Śaṁkara and Vedānta through Paul Deussen, who took him at what he (Deussen) understood to be his word. It is probable that Deussen saw in him a good Hegelian and even read into the Upanishads his own Hegelianism. At any rate, Indian thought for us became Vedāntic and the great Vedāntist Śaṁkara. He and his "system" filled the Indian sector of our widening horizon. But Śaṁkara himself did not resolve the contradictions of his sources by Hegelian dialectic. Nor did he know the Absolute as certainly as did Hegel. Nor was he conscious of occupying, of preempting the whole realm of Hindu thought. He plead a cause—and there were many adversaries. Perhaps, after all, we may take some words of his own as the measure of his achievement, "Vedānta intends to teach the oneness of the Ātman [*i.e.*, the Brahman, universal Spirit]" (*atmaikatva vidyaprate pattiye sarve vedanta arabhyante*). It is significant that Rāmānuja, somewhat "sectarian," but Vedāntic by tradition and intelligent devotion, could take the very sources which Śaṁkara and other predecessors used, and see sincerely a "modified *advaita*," with a surer place for God. In the minds of multitudes of Hindus he offered—by reason, and on the basis of their Scriptures—a surer way to Life. Rāmānuja was frankly theological. His *Bhāṣya*, "Commentary," on the *Vedānta-sūtras* retained the clear religious substance of the Vedic-Upanishadic tradition. Like a certain Moslem ṣūfī, of whom he had doubtless heard, he never lost in ecstasy a substantial God. God to him was both first and last, man's creator and redeemer. He had found a critical monistic realism, we might say, where Śaṁkara had found *advaitavāda*.

BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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Between *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, published in March, 1932, and Bergson's preceding principal work, *Creative Evolution*, twenty-five years had elapsed. During that period the material and problems of his latest work were probably his chief subject of study. It is true that a considerable amount of other writing and activity came within this period, but some of this other work is closely related to the subject of his latest book. In 1919 the collection of essays, *L'Énergie spirituelle*, dealt with themes that he draws upon again in *Les Deux Sources. Durée et simultanéité* in 1922 was concerned with his central metaphysical idea in relation to Einstein's theory. There were a few essays before the War not gathered up into *Mind-Energy* (translated by H. Wildon Carr in 1920), and a few after the War, but none apparently after 1924. Bergson was president of the Society of Psychical Research in 1913. In 1914 he was elected to membership in the French Academy. When the League of Nations organized a Committee of twelve members for intellectual co-operation, he was appointed its president; but in 1925 his health compelled him to retire from this office. On the whole it is safe to say that during twenty-five years Bergson's principal preoccupation was with the problems of morality and religion.

This latest work of Bergson, like his other principal writings, is based upon a close study of the factual material. When I had an opportunity of an interview with him, while I was attending his lectures in the autumn of 1911, he remarked that he never wrote a book till he felt compelled to do so by inward necessity. He was not interested in rounding out a system by covering the principal formal fields of philosophy. Hence he might never go on from the field of biology to those of history, ethics and religion. But he implied that if he did write another book, it was likely to be in this latter realm. Perhaps this attitude on the part of Bergson helps to explain not only the fewness of his principal writings, but their enormous influence. When the English translation of his latest work was published in

1935 the French original had already gone through seventeen editions, and when the latter first appeared most of his other books had gone through twenty or thirty editions—thirty-nine in the case of *L'Évolution créatrice*.

One may be prompted to ask, indeed, whether the length of time which passed between *Creative Evolution* and *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* has not rendered the latter work an anachronism. It presupposes the doctrine of Creative Advance in the universe and finds in that doctrine the explanation of religion and morality in their deeper essence. But in influential theological circles today, and also in the more radical phases of ethical thought, this doctrine of Creative Advance is looked upon as a product of romantic optimism, without foundation in critical thought and realistic knowledge. Hence the marked theological tendency to regard the object of religious faith as being purely supernatural; and hence the disposition of radical ethical and social thinkers to place their hopes in revolution.

But Bergson himself is not aloof from the problems created by the War and the subsequent social disorders. His philosophy concerns itself with arrests of the life-process which have proven to be final, as well as with the signal instances of Creative Advance. Moreover, he often says of these signal instances in the past that they might not have occurred, that the effort involved might not have been made. So at the present time he points out that the recovery of civilization, or the new departures which creative morality and religion envision, are by no means predestined to come to pass. What he is concerned to do is to show that Creative Advance will not come to pass by methods in which we are prone to trust, and to help us to realize the inward and spiritual processes on which any new Creative Advance depends.

Whether Bergson's philosophy of religion, and his general philosophy, are to be assessed wholly in terms of the period when his thought took shape—the second half of the century between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the outbreak of the Great War—or whether he has important things to say to the subsequent period because he in some measure transcended his own, it is appropriate to look at this latest work, published when the author was seventy-one, in the light of his earlier philosophical affiliations.

Professor Whitehead is disposed to regard Bergson as the most characteristic philosopher of his epoch, as Locke was of his earlier

epoch. He gives as his reason that "Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of physiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static materialism of the seventeenth century." (*Science and the Modern World*, pp. 205, 206.) In his student days, however, Bergson was a convinced adherent of the mechanistic explanation of nature. He was a brilliant mathematician and evoked the admiration of the experts. "Bergson's genius, moreover, was geometrical. Algebra seemed to him a convenient language, but he viewed things spatially." (Jacques Chevalier, *Henri Bergson*, p. 45.) At the École Normale, where he was a contemporary of Jaurès and Durkheim, the prevailing influences among the students were Taine, Renan, and the positivist school of thought. In the history of philosophy Bergson had Boutroux as a teacher, but the latter kept strictly to the historical task. The chief influence upon Bergson in the field of philosophy was Herbert Spencer. He cherished the ideal of extending the mechanistic explanation throughout the universe, only in a fashion more exact and condensed than that of Spencer.

It was during seven years spent in teaching philosophy in the provinces that his philosophical conversion took place. In his study of Spencer he came to the conclusion that the idea of time in the mechanistic mode of explanation did not permit any genuine account of evolution. He found that mechanistic thought spatializes time, and that in consequence the elements from which Spencer derived the complex forms of life were only tiny fragments of the evolved product. This point he elaborated later in the closing pages of *Creative Evolution*. (*L'Évolution créatrice*, pp. 392 ff.) What was missing was actual duration. This point was confirmed in Bergson's mind when he was lecturing on the Eleatics. The paradoxes of Zeno result from this same spatializing of time.

Where, then, was real duration to be found? Bergson answered: "In consciousness." We know in consciousness a reality which both changes and endures, the self. Accordingly here is the clue both to the evolution of life and to motion in the physical world. Only, the self must not be conceived as a substratum which combines different states. What we must apprehend is the self as it is given in consciousness, of which the very stuff is duration.

This philosophical conversion, focussed in the intuition of the nature of time, swung Bergson into the spiritualistic stream in French

thought, in contrast to the positivistic stream. Jacques Chevalier, professor of philosophy in the university of Grenoble, in his book, *Henri Bergson,* published in 1926, gives an informing account of this spiritualistic stream of thought in the opening chapter concerning Bergson's *milieu.* Chevalier goes back, as Bergson himself did in his essay "La philosophie," (1915) to Maine de Biran. From this essay Chevalier quotes the following:

"In the very beginning of the century France had a great metaphysician, the greatest she has produced since Descartes and Malebranche—Maine de Biran. His doctrine, though little noticed at the moment it appeared, exercised increasing influence; we may even ask if the path first opened up by this philosopher is not the one which metaphysics must ultimately follow. Contrary to Kant (for those who have called him the 'French Kant' are in error), Maine de Biran considered the human mind capable, in one respect at least, of reaching the absolute and making it the object of its speculative thought. He has shown that the knowledge we have of ourselves, especially in the feeling of effort, is a privileged knowledge which exceeds the bounds of pure 'phenomenon' and attains reality 'in itself,' that reality which Kant declared to be inaccessible to thought. In short, he conceived of a metaphysics that would rise ever higher and higher, toward mind in general, in proportion as consciousness descended deeper into the depths of the inner life." (*La philosophie,* pp. 15-16; quoted by Chevalier, pp. 16-17.)

From 'the primitive fact of the inner sense' Maine de Biran derived not only the principle of causality, and the uniqueness of personality, but also the reality of the Divine Spirit: "For we sense the fact that our good thoughts and impulses do not proceed from ourselves. This intimate communion of the Spirit with our own spirit, when we are able to summon it and prepare it a dwelling-place within, is an actual psychological fact and not an act of faith alone." (Quoted from Maine de Biran by Chevalier, p. 19.)

The successors in this spiritualistic tradition, leading down to Bergson, are Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux. Renouvier, who influenced James so much, seems not to have been among the formative influences of Bergson.

Ravaisson made a criticism of mechanism as an adequate explanation of physical nature in terms which Bergson later could appro-

priate. He pointed out "that mechanism in the instances where we know its origin is not cause, but effect." These instances are the formation of human habits. And Bergson, commenting on Ravaisson, wrote: "Our inner experience shows us, in habit, an activity which has passed by insensible degrees from consciousness to unconsciousness, and from free will to automatism. Is it not under this form, then, like a consciousness become obscured and a will become inactive, that we ought to depict nature? Habit thus affords us a living proof that mechanism furnishes no explanation of itself that is self-sufficient; on this view it would be but the fossilized residuum of a spiritual activity, so to speak." (*Cf.* Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 20.)

In an influential treatise concerning *La philosophie en France au XIX^e^ siècle* (1867) Ravaisson makes a fundamental distinction between two philosophical methods, analysis and synthesis. The former is used by mechanism which reduces everything to the most elementary state of physical existence. It is used, likewise by idealism which reduces things to the most elementary logical states of the understanding. Both descend toward a minimum of reality and intelligibility. "Mechanism and idealism are thus but two forms of materialism." The other method, that of synthesis, seeks the unity of things and assumes that "nothing exists without a reason, *i.e.*, without a governing principle and an aim." It thus mounts from the lower to the higher, till it reaches "the reason which is self-justified and all-sufficient unto itself, in a word, to the apex of the perfect personality which is wisdom and infinite love, as well as plenitude of spiritual liberty." In this spiritualistic doctrine God serves for the understanding of the soul, and the soul for the understanding of nature. Concerning this treatise Bergson wrote: "No analysis can give an idea of these admirable pages. Twenty generations of students have known them by heart." (*Op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.)

Ravaisson's spiritual successor was Lachelier. "Less of an artist," says Chevalier, "but more of a logician than Ravaisson, possessed of incomparable vigor, profundity, and range of thought, Lachelier, by his teaching and personal influence, no less than by the slender volumes in which he has delivered the essence of his reflections, exercised a decisive influence upon the whole generation that succeeded him." (*Op. cit.*, p. 24.) He was no longer teaching when Bergson entered the École Normale, but his notes were in circulation among the stu-

dents. To him Bergson dedicated his thesis, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience,* and wrote of him, "Himself an incomparable master, his thought was the sustenance of several generations of masters."

Lachelier attached himself to Kant but sought to go further in order to attain full reality. He held that the law of efficient causes is the only basis for affirming the unity of the universe, but this law is hypothetical, and must be supplemented by the judgment of finality which is categorical. Efficient causality gives the unity of a series. Finality gives the unity of a system. It is the only complete method for accounting for both thought and nature. But finality itself requires explanation through the action of free will, which is involved in all determination of ends and aims. Thus causality, finality, liberty, form the ascending scale of philosophic thought, and for material idealism we must substitute a spiritual realism, "to which every being is a force, and every force a train of thought tending to a more and more complete consciousness of itself." Liberty in turn reaches its highest manifestation in the act of faith by which one realizes that a sacrifice of self is necessary for apprehending the Supreme Perfection and for passing from the idea of God to God himself.

Boutroux summed up the thought of his master Lachelier in the following words: "What remains to be said, except that man's vocation is to live in God and through God? All philosophy that does not find the end of its quest in religion is formal and abstract. . . . It is in God and in Him alone that we find, in its reality and plenitude, being, movement, and life. We can only cease desiring our own will and way if God condescends to desire His will in us." (*Cf.* Chevalier, *op. cit.,* pp. 25-28.)

It was Boutroux who was Bergson's own teacher and of whom he was in a real sense the successor. Boutroux' own philosophizing was concerned first of all with the problem of necessity and liberty. This problem he solved, not in terms of Kant's critical idealism but in more realistic fashion. He affirmed liberty on the basis of consciousness, which bears witness to liberty as a fact, and this he supported by maintaining the contingency of the laws of nature. Nature presents us with "reality distinct from the mind, which the mind perceives, but does not create." (Quoted from Boutroux by Chevalier, *op. cit.,* p. 29.) But the hallmark of this reality is contingency. "Necessity," said

Boutroux, lecturing at Harvard in 1910, "is an acquired form, not a first cause; it rests upon contingency and cannot do away with it. The laws of nature are its habits." (Chevalier, p. 31.)

Contingency, however, is not opposed to order in the sense of meaning and purpose, but only to the necessity of which the contrary is impossible. "The contingent is that which happens, but which might not have happened. The contingent, therefore, is in no sense the negation of order. On the contrary, it is the perfect expression of rational order because it is *the order which may miscarry and not come to pass, and therefore must have some reason for coming to pass.* The contingent action is the type of free action. I *can* do this or that; if I decide to do this, and not that, it is because I have a reason for choosing to do one rather than the other." (Chevalier's exposition of Boutroux, *op. cit.*, p. 31.)

Another reason for affirming contingency of reality is the qualitative discontinuity which the world manifests, and the appearance of something new each time that we pass from a lower order of things to a higher. The unity of the world, then, is the unity of a diversity. The different orders have a certain degree of independence from each other. It is only when we view things from above the hierarchy of orders that we perceive a true unity and continuity between them.

Thus Boutroux' philosophy, like that of his predecessors, culminates in religion. "In God, and in God alone—the principle of order—is realized the supreme unity, not a subduing and tyrannical but a harmonious unity, which unites individuals perfectly without absorbing them, and makes perfect order compatible with sovereign liberty." (Chevalier's exposition, *op. cit.*, p. 34.) If our civilization does not return to God, said Boutroux writing in October, 1914, it will founder "in a cultured barbarism."

This stream of spiritualistic thought in French philosophy, then, forms the historical background for Bergson's own philosophical work. But Bergson would protest strenuously against the piecing together of any significant philosophy out of previous systems, and such a protest would apply emphatically to his own philosophy. Moreover, the influence of the positivistic stream in which his thought first moved, and of his own training in exact science, always remained with him. He always sought for a broad basis for his philosophy in factual knowledge and to mold his thought upon reality. It was Bergson's

aim, as he himself says, "to carry metaphysics into the domain of experience and, by making an appeal to science and to consciousness, and developing the faculty of intuition, to constitute a philosophy capable of providing, not only general theories, but also concrete explanations of particular facts. Philosophy, thus understood, is capable of the same precision as positive science. Like science, it may progress unceasingly by adding together the results once obtained. But it will aim besides (and it is in this respect that it differentiates itself from science) at extending further and further the confines of the understanding, even were it to shatter certain of them, and to expand human thought indefinitely." (Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 35; quoted from *La philosophie* (1915) p. 19.) Accordingly we see that it was really a positive metaphysics that Bergson was seeking to found.

This same purpose, which has been manifested in all his principal works, has guided the working out of his philosophy of religion. He has given the same prolonged study to the empirical material in religion and morality as he gave when engaged with the problems of physical nature and of life and consciousness, and he has made the same effort to penetrate to the inner reality of the phenomena with which he is dealing. Let us, then, consider first his views concerning the factual material, and secondly the relation of these views to his general metaphysics.

The two sources of morality and religion, as given in Bergson's book with this title, are social instinct and mystical intuition. As these functions operate in human life they give a two-fold character to both morality and religion. In consequence we have both closed morality and open morality, and both static religion and dynamic religion. The two forms of morality and the two forms of religion, although they may have rather complex relations with each other, really constitute two quite distinct types in each field. One of Bergson's principal theses is that men do not pass from closed to open morality, or from static to dynamic religion, simply by a broadening out process. On the contrary, open morality and dynamic religion require a great spiritual effort such as may enable man to free himself from the complexities and inertia of the closed society and static religion, and by apprehending Life itself in its integral character, may enable him to become a new expression of the Creative Impetus which is the essential nature of Life. But while the two types in each field are sharply

contrasted with each other in Bergson's thought, open morality is the product of dynamic religion, and static religion is the extension and reinforcement of closed morality. Hence we are perhaps justified in simplifying our discussion by subsuming Bergson's theory of ethics under his general philosophy of religion.

It is, however, with an analysis of moral obligation that Bergson begins. "The remembrance of forbidden fruit," he says, "is the earliest thing in the memory of each of us, as it is in the memory of mankind." (*Morality and Religion*, p. 1.) The prohibitions of our parents have behind them the weight of society. We feel a sense of obligation. This obligation can be disobeyed, but we feel its pressure. We hypostasize this pressure into an Idea of the Platonic sort, which governs us as Nature has been supposed to be governed by Laws. Religion completes the impression that these obligations are truths of Nature.

This pressure does not all come from without. The obligation which is a bond between men binds us to ourselves. One may remember Kipling's Forest Officer who, alone in his bungalow in the forest, dressed for dinner every evening. These inner ties form a social ego, and moral distress arises from a throwing out of gear of these ties. Thus social claim is the real root of obligation. At this point Bergson's thought is similar to that of William James, who held that active claims, not abstract principles, were the basis of the moral life, the problem being to secure the maximum of harmonious fulfilment of these claims.

Since these obligations which spring from social pressure require co-ordinating, reason has a rôle to play; it functions by subordinating particular social demands to principles. But the essence of obligation is not a requirement of reason. Either social pressures have become canalized in us in the form of habits which approximate to instinct, or, when we hesitate and deliberate, there is still a massive totality of obligation, due to the interpenetration of social pressures, which enforces our moral decision. Here is Bergson's explanation of the so-called categorical imperative. "An absolutely categorical imperative," he says, "is instinctive or somnambulistic." (P. 17.) It simply says to us: "You must because you must."

Having shown that moral obligation in general is instinctive in character, Bergson goes on to explain how intelligence becomes subservient to instinct, and why he regards intuition as the true liberator.

Bergson points to the two lines of evolution which have produced societies that are similar to organisms—that of the Arthropods, culminating in the ant-hill and the bee-hive; and that of the Vertebrates, culminating in the various human societies. In the highest of the vertebrates, man, the most distinctive function from the evolutionary point of view is the tool-making intelligence. With the ants and bees it is instinct alone which functions, its instruments being supplied entirely by the individual organism. Intelligence introduces inventiveness, liberty, choice into the operations of life, the fruits of which appear in human societies in the varieties of language and of culture in all its aspects. At the same time if these fruits are to be conserved they must be deposited in the customs of society and the habits of the individual. These customs and habits, in turn, can be changed by further applications of intelligence; but to be successful these changes must be subordinated to the organic unity of the *de facto* society. The rules of society are not necessary, but there is the necessity for a rule; hence the development of a basic sense of obligation which functions as a virtual instinct. "A human being feels an obligation only if he is free, and each obligation, considered separately, implies liberty. But it is necessary that there should be obligations and the deeper we go, away from those particular obligations which are at the top, towards obligation as a whole, which is at the bottom, the more obligation appears as the very form assumed by necessity in the realm of life, when it demands, for the accomplishment of certain ends, intelligence, choice, and therefore liberty." (*Op. cit.*, p. 21.)

It is the very operation of intelligence which evokes obligation and supplies its content. But obligation must function as a virtual instinct, for a reason similar to that which keeps the worker-bee to its specially differentiated task. Man, as Bergson reiterates, was made by nature for small societies and the morality which these societies develop stops at their boundaries. When these societies are enlarged by conquest, or enriched by a great and varied culture, the basic nature of social man does not change. We do not inherit acquired characteristics. Just as the creative impetus which launched new and higher forms of life has everywhere become arrested in fixed species, so in man the great forward movement exemplified in intelligence has turned in upon itself and formed a closed circle in our actual societies, which are closed societies. Intelligence now operates to reinforce these closed societies.

War is the counterpart of this closed morality. "Our social duties aim at social cohesion; whether we will or no they compose for us an attitude which is that of discipline in the face of an enemy." (*Op. cit.*, p. 23.) "We are fond of saying that the apprenticeship to civic virtue is served in the family, and that in the same way, from holding our country dear we learn to love mankind. Our sympathies are supposed to broaden out in an unbroken progression, to expand while remaining identical, and to end by embracing all humanity. This is *a priori* reasoning, the result of a purely intellectualist conception of the soul." (*Op. cit.*, p. 24.)

But by intuition man has proven able to transcend this closed morality. The higher morality is gained at a bound, another kind of obligation supervenes. Exceptional men arise who incarnate it. Such have been the prophets of Israel, the sages of Greece, the saints of Christianity, the arhats of Buddhism. This higher morality is human, not civic or social. Its method is the imitation of a model. It works by appeal, not constraint. One who has been touched by a great moral personality has a longing to resemble him, and this longing is incipient resemblance. In this fashion arises an emotion which contrasts with instinct or habit. It is the attitude of the open soul. Pioneers in morality proceed as do creators in art. In each case a new emotion is at work and the emotion begets thought. It is supra-intellectual and pregnant with representations, in contrast to the feelings which follow upon representations and are infra-intellectual. "A work of genius," says Bergson, "is in most cases the outcome of an emotion, unique of its kind, which seemed to baffle expression, and yet which *had* to express itself." Indeed, "anyone engaged in writing has been in a position to feel the difference between an intelligence left to itself and that which burns with the fire of an original and unique emotion, born of the identification of the author with his subject, that is to say of intuition." (P. 38.)

The true function of religion is not to enforce morality by a metaphysics, but to engender the new emotion out of which a new morality can come. The emotion introduced by Christianity under the name of charity is an instance. Both metaphysics and morality follow upon the emotion and express the same thing, one in terms of intelligence, and the other in terms of will. The obligation introduced by open morality is one of attraction and aspiration. It contains the feeling of progress

and is marked by liberation and joy. The morality of the Gospels is of this type, whereas Stoicism had not the same effect because it was essentially a philosophy. Socrates the sage, although he was the defender of reason, illustrates the creative type. His mission itself was of the religious and mystic order.

Our actual morality is a fusion in varying degrees of these two types of obligation, that of pressure and that of aspiration. It is important for us to recognize how different are the sources of the two types. But when we have done so we can go on to recognize that the former type was originally derived from the latter. " 'Social pressure' and 'impetus of love' are but two complementary manifestations of life, normally intent on preserving generally the social form which was characteristic of the human species from the beginning, but, exceptionally, capable of transfiguring it, thanks to individuals who each represent, as the appearance of a new species would have represented, an effort of creative evolution." (*Op. cit.*, p. 87.)

We see, then, that Bergson finds the source of creative morality in religion. But religion, in turn, he finds to be of two types, namely, static religion and dynamic religion, and static religion operates to reenforce the closed society. The dominant characteristic of static religion is the myth-making function. This function is evoked by intelligence as a counterpoise against certain tendencies of intelligence which threaten social cohesion.

Bergson grants to Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim that the great mass of ideas in static religion throughout the world are superstitious and the products of phantasy. But he criticizes the former for attributing this body of phantasmic material to a 'primitive mentality' which civilized man has outgrown, and the latter for attributing the same material to a 'collective mentality' which is of another nature than the modern mind. These theories, he says, really assume the inheritance of acquired characteristics and consequently a growth in man's fundamental mentality, and they fail to explain the power of myths today.

Hence Bergson raises anew the question of the utility of the myth-making function. We find societies at the end of two great lines of evolution. In the case of the Hymenoptera the societies are swayed entirely by instinct. Bergson is said to have spent long vacations in studying, like Fabre, the behavior of ants and bees. At the end of the other great line is mankind, manifesting two great characteristics,

intelligence and sociability. But these two characteristics may come to be at odds with each other. Intelligence is inventive; it makes for initiative, independence, liberty. It thus tends to break down discipline and to endanger social cohesion. The myth-making tendency is nature's compensation. "Religion is then a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence." (*Op. cit.*, p. 112.) This appears in three different ways. First, religion works for social preservation. The gods arise to prohibit, to prevent, to punish. Bergson cites the instance of the woman who was saved from walking into an open elevator-shaft by the hallucination of an attendant who thrust her back. Secondly, religion works to stimulate and guide individual activities, because it is a defensive reaction of nature against the representation by intelligence of the inevitability of death. Thirdly, religious representations "are defensive reactions of nature against the representation, by the intelligence, of the depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired." (P. 130.) That is, religion serves to sustain the optimistic attitude inherent in the vital impulse.

In coping with this depressing margin of the unexpected, ideas of Luck take on a semi-divine character, and in general, "semi-personal powers" or "efficient presences" are evoked. As an illustration of how these presences function Bergson cites William James's spontaneous personification of the earthquake. To this instance he adds two similar experiences of his own: one when the horse he was riding suddenly bolted, and the other at the outbreak of the War when he felt the War as an invisible presence which had been lurking in the background through forty-three years of vague foreboding. Bergson finds a further psychological illustration of his view in the "special faculty of voluntary hallucination" which appears with some authors as they live with their characters, and with children as they develop unseen playmates. It is, in fact with such "efficient presences" that the origin of religion is bound up. Religion in this aspect, then, supplies strength and discipline. To this end its rituals are necessary. What binds society together is tradition. To preserve and strengthen this bond is the function of natural religion.

But there remains religion in its other aspect, dynamic religion. Religion in this form also counterbalances intelligence and restores poise and serenity, but it does so by mounting anew to the source of

Life. To do this requires intense concentration and effort, and hence involves something different from natural religion which operates by habit and instinct. The latter is infra-intellectual, whereas dynamic religion is supra-intellectual. It has its most specific manifestation in the great mystics.

The great current of energy which is Life, says Bergson, coursing through matter, has suffered arrest in species which are static organizations of matter. This current of energy has gone far enough along one line of evolution to produce societies—those insect societies in which there is no inventiveness and which are swayed by the somnambulism of instinct. The creative effort has been far more successful along the line which has ended in man. Here too societies have been achieved, which moreover are capable of progress because consciousness in man has taken the form of tool-making intelligence, involving inventiveness and reflection. But a complementary development has been necessary in order to preserve the cohesiveness of the various human societies. This development has appeared in the morality of social pressure and in static religion. The result has been to produce closed societies in which intelligence and morality have become subservient to the infra-intellectual social instinct. The closed societies involve arrests of development like the arrests in the different species of life. The arrests are ominous for they involve the naturalness and inevitability of war. Is there any hope that the closed circles of these static societies can be broken through?

All new species, says Bergson, have been attained at a bound; they have not come to pass by continuous natural selection. Fortunately in mysticism we have evidence that the creative effort can be made by which, as by a sudden leap, a new emotion may be brought into being, an emotion pregnant with new spiritual possibilities. True mysticism, indeed, is rare, as in the case of any form of genius. But when it calls to us "there is in the innermost being of most men the whisper of an echo." (*Op. cit.*, p. 202.) Moreover, it may lodge itself in static religion and partially remold it. "Thus may arise a mixed religion, implying a new direction given to the old, a more or less marked aspiration for the ancient god who emanated from the myth-making function to be merged into the God Who effectively reveals Himself, Who illuminates and warms privileged souls by His presence." (*Op. cit.*, p. 203.) In any event the ultimate end of mysticism

—here is Bergson's definition—"is the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not God himself. The great mystic is to be conceived as an individual being, capable of transcending the limitations imposed upon the species by its material nature, thus continuing and extending the divine action." (*Op. cit.*, 209.)

Mysticism, Bergson thinks, is but slightly revealed in the pagan mysteries. In reality they are not very mystical, but serve to reinforce static religion. Yet upon certain of them there is the stamp of some great personality. Mysticism is to be seen in Greek thought at its climax, when the metamorphosis of dialectics into mysticism takes place with Plotinus. But Plotinus only reached ecstasy. A higher point is reached when, "as contemplation is engulfed in action, the human will becomes one with the divine will." (*Op. cit.*, p. 210.) Hindu thought also fell short of the highest point. There too ecstasy is gained. But complete mysticism is action, creation, love. This result appears in the great Christian mystics: St. Paul, St. Teresa, St. Catherine of Siena, St. Francis, Joan of Arc. We should not be disaffected by certain abnormal aspects which the experiences of the great mystics manifest. These are incidental as they are, for example, with musical geniuses. We need only stop to think "what a shock to the soul is the passing from the static to the dynamic, from the closed to the open, from everyday life to mystic life." (*Op. cit.*, p. 218.) The "darkest night" of which the mystics often speak is preliminary to the total union. Then follows a boundless impetus. The mystics are *adjutores Dei*. But this consciousness does not mean an attitude of pride; rather it produces a great humility. Love is now no longer simply the love of God. It is the love of God for all men.

The essence of Christianity, Bergson says, was to be the diffusion of mysticism. The fountain head of this mysticism is the Christ of the Gospels. As the mysticism becomes diffused the resultant religion is related to the dynamic source as popularization is related to science. The outcome is a mode of mixed religion which retains a reverence for the saint and mystic, but which largely reinforces the closed society. Can this creative impetus manifested by the great mystics succeed? Bergson asks; and he answers: "If possible at all, it can only be by using simultaneously or successively two very different

methods." (*Op. cit.*, p. 224.) The requirements are that intellectual activity be intensified to set more human action at liberty; and that tiny handfuls of spiritual souls spread their impetus of love. This implies that complete mysticism will transcend contemplation and become dynamic. "We find this impetus," says Bergson, "in the prophets: they longed passionately for justice, demanded it in the name of the God of Israel; and Christianity, which succeeded Judaism, owed largely to the Jewish prophets its active mysticism, capable of marching on to the conquest of the world." (*Op. cit.*, p. 229.)

But let us now ask, what is the relation of Bergson's conception of dynamic religion and of open morality to his philosophy as a whole? We shall get a partial answer if we turn to his consideration of the problem of the existence and the nature of God as presented in his latest work.

The deep-seated agreement of the great mystics is a sign of an identity of intuition which is best explained by the actual existence of the Being with whom they believe themselves to have intercourse. This suffices for the mystic. "An emotion of a superior order," says Bergson, "is self-sufficient." (*Op. cit.*, p. 243.) But the testimony of mysticism cannot provide the philosopher with certainty. On the other hand, Bergson cannot accept Plato's Idea of the Good, or Aristotle's Unmoved Mover as establishing the reality of God. Experience is for him the only source of knowledge. But for the philosopher there is the convergence of great "lines of facts." The evidence of biology, Bergson has previously shown, gives us the idea of a vital impetus and a creative evolution. The energy thus at work in matter is of the same order as consciousness. In intuition we apprehend the continuity of consciousness and the inner working of the vital impetus and thus are brought to the life principle in general.

The study of mysticism pursues an independent line of facts. But when it shows the mystic breaking through closed morality and static religion and achieving an open morality, inclusive of all mankind, and a religion that is dynamic, then the two lines of facts are seen to converge and the mystics appear as the climax of creative evolution.

"God is love, and the object of love: herein," writes Bergson, "lies the whole contribution of mysticism." From this point of view God can be held to be a person without involving gross assimilations of him to man. If one would have a suggestion of how God can be both

a person and a creative power, let him consider authorship in its more ambitious, venturesome form. The author may experience an imperative demand for creation, perhaps fully felt only once in a life-time, which he feels comes from the very depths of things, which calls for the originating of new words and ideas or else strains the bounds of old ones, and which may provide a life-long task. Such an experience adumbrates the creation of matter by form. To the philosopher who holds to the mystical experience Creation will appear "as God undertaking to create creators, that He may have, besides Himself, beings worthy of His love." (*Op. cit.*, p. 243.)

From the standpoint of the philosopher, to be sure, we are still in the field of probabilities. But philosophic certainty admits of degrees and calls for intuition as well as reason, and any profound extension of intuition will be of a mystical nature. Since mystic intuition completes creative evolution it gives a high degree of certainty. A lyrical passage may be quoted in summary of Bergson's cosmology: "Granted the existence of a creative energy which is love, and which desires to produce from itself beings worthy to be loved, it might indeed sow space with worlds whose materiality, as the opposite of divine spirituality, would simply express the distinction between being created and creating, between the multifarious notes, strung like pearls, of a symphony and the indivisible emotion from which they sprang." (*Op. cit.*, p. 245.)

Bergson in conclusion touches briefly upon the problem of evil, which, however, he will not brush aside as being reducible to a lesser good. Suffering is a terrible reality which no theodicy may hide. But there is an empirical optimism which may be based on the two facts: that humanity finds life on the whole to be good; and that there is a joy beyond pain which is the final state of the mystic soul. Bergson adds that there is nothing to prove that suffering was willed by a God of love. The assumption that such must be the case results from an abstract conception of omnipotence which is only a pseudo-idea. If divine omnipotence is used in a religious sense it will mean, as we learn from the mystics, "an energy to which no limit can be assigned, and a power of creating and loving which surpasses all imagination." (*Op. cit.*, p. 251.)

When Bergson finally adverts to the problems of the after-life he again points to the meeting of two different experiences. In *Matter*

and Memory he has shown the inadequacy of the physiological explanation of memory and the necessity of conceiving the soul as "overflowing" the brain and the body. Such study suggests the probability of the survival of the soul. He now brings in the mystic intuition which presents itself as a participation in the divine essence. "Can the after-life," he asks, "which is apparently assured to the soul by the simple fact that, even here below, a great part of its activity is independent of the body, be identical with that of the life into which, even here below, certain privileged souls insert themselves?" (*Op. cit.*, pp. 252, 253.) Here the problem must remain open, awaiting prolonged investigation. But it should suffice that, with respect to the knowledge of the soul and its destiny, there is opened the possibility of endless progress.

Thus we can see that the different parts of Bergson's philosophy are closely bound up together. His interpretation of mysticism and of society as a whole rests back upon the doctrine of creative evolution, which in turn presupposes his doctrine of intuition and his special intuition of duration, together with its essentially psychic character. It is the intuition of duration which is the basis of his criticism of mechanism and which leads to his utilitarian, pragmatic doctrine of intelligence. It is the primacy of duration also which leads to his view of matter as a derivative of vital impetus, a resistant to it, and an instrument for it. And it is the psychic character of duration which grounds his doctrines of the immaterial character of memory, and of the brain as an instrument for action and for choice, instead of its being the organ of memory.

How far, we may ask, does Bergson continue the tradition of the French spiritualistic philosophy and how far is he originative? Only a few suggestions can be offered here in answer. In the ideas of the relative independence and initiative of the human soul with respect to the order of nature, and of the personalistic relation of the soul to God one sees the spiritualistic tradition at work. It likewise appears in the appeal to religious intuition as the completion of philosophy. It is Bergson's primary intuition of time or duration which, on the one hand led to his abandonment of mechanical explanations of nature, and which on the other introduced a new principle into the spiritualistic tradition that tended to leaven and remold much of its content. French spiritualism was still to a considerable extent under the influence of

Kant. It departed from Kant primarily in asserting that we know the soul as it is in itself and in drawing the consequences from this position for the doctrine of liberty and the doctrine of God. Bergson's intuition of time as metaphysically real has prompted his re-study of the material of the empirical sciences in terms of process and his effort to achieve an empirical metaphysics in which life, mind, morality, and religion shall have full ontological significance because of their creative participation in the time-process.

Certain critical comments suggest themselves. It is not clear that the inventiveness of intelligence and the liberty which flows from it should be as sharply distinguished as Bergson makes it to be from the creativeness of intuition and the liberty which flows from that. Since intelligence and intuition are complementary in the total life-process, why may they not function concurrently and together? This query may be given application to the realm of physical nature. Whitehead thinks that on the whole the history of philosophy bears out Bergson's charge that the human intellect 'spatializes the universe,' but he thinks Bergson was wrong in supposing that this was a necessity of the intellect. This means that Bergson has made a contribution towards restoring fluency to nature, but has unduly depreciated the intellect's function in a metaphysics of nature.

Something similar might be said of Bergson's criticism of teleological knowledge. It is difficult to separate creativity from purposeful activity and to think of purposeful activity without guiding principles of structure or value. Granted that the time-process is misconceived unless we recognize that in it things which are genuinely new can be brought to pass; is it not still true that the significance of the new must be estimated in terms of forms whose validity we already know?

Again in the field of morals and religion, can we have creative action except in terms of what we must acknowledge to be eternal values? If the prophet in Hebrew-Christian religion is the prototype of later inspired spirits who may be able to break through the bounds of closed morality and static religion, must we not recognize that it is on the basis of the character of God as embodying eternal values apprehensible by men, that the prophet fulfils a divine mission in his own time and remains a revealer of God to after ages?

On the other hand it remains true that the intuition of time, of which Bergson has been perhaps our foremost interpreter, has

contributed in a most important way to the philosophy of nature, and to the interpretation of the spiritual life of man in relation both to nature and to God. Without the reality of time the reality of the eternal is impoverished in its meaning. At least that must be true for a religion which is at once historical, ethical, and spiritual—characteristics which seem to be almost equally important in Hebrew and Christian religion.

Bergson's *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* is concluded under the shadow of the threat of another war. This appears especially in his final chapter, "Mechanics and Mysticism," to the thought of which I can only briefly allude in conclusion. He recognizes that the problems of our civilization center around the problems of industrialization. He discounts the view, however, that science and invention have caused the passion for luxuries which is insatiable and demands limitless expansion. Rather it is the passion for luxuries which has captured the inventive and industrial process. There is no such thing as overproduction except as it be in relation to the artificial needs of men rather than their real needs. Without a development of industry which shall deliver all men from hunger and meet their basic needs there is no possibility of realizing the open morality which has been glimpsed as an ideal in democracy. But perhaps there will come a return to asceticism, or to a great simplification of life. Man seems to be subject to a 'law of twofold frenzy' by which a great passion of emotion must work itself out, but by which the complementary passion is also evoked. Once all the commercial world was obsessed by the traffic in spices, which are to us now such trivial objects of interest. Perhaps again great mystics may lead the way to a transvaluation of values, as was once done by St. Francis, which this time shall result in a deliverance of intelligence and invention from subservience to the closed society, and make them means for the expression of love for all mankind.

Meanwhile Bergson has a final suggestion. Perhaps we should not count too much on the advent of the privileged soul. Instead our thought may be directed to the science of spirit as it has been directed for several centuries to the science of nature. Here again Bergson becomes an advocate of the scientific study of telepathy and of psychical research as at least an important auxiliary for the development of man's spiritual powers and for a fuller diffusion of mysticism. Thus

men may attain to the level of joy through a new simplicity of life and a new vision of the life beyond.

When one views Bergson's philosophy of religion and the rest of his philosophy together one is led to see that they mutually condition each other in important ways. His doctrine of creative evolution and his intuition of the metaphysical reality of time support his position that the highest phase of mysticism is a mysticism of the moral will, rather than one of absorption into eternal substance. Union with ultimate being in ecstatic contemplation cannot be the climax of a philosophy of creative evolution. But such a philosophy can find climactic expression in the union with ultimate reality experienced in the religion of superabounding active love. This dynamic quality of mysticism Bergson establishes by pointing to its emergence in the Hebrew prophets and by finding its fountain-head in the Christ of the Gospels. Surely it is exemplified in the Apostle Paul. It is to this mysticism of the moral will that Bergson looks for the creative effort which can break the bonds of closed morality and static religion, bring intelligence into the service of active love, set free the spiritual imagination, and carry life beyond all contrasts of pleasure and pain to the joy which marks the union with the Eternal Creative Spirit.

THE FAITH OF A MYSTICAL NATURALIST

By Bernard Eugene Meland
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The mystical naturalist holds a tentative course in the matter of guiding truths, for his venture is continually fronted with expanding horizons and the view from any opening is partial. Yet these limitations of vision do not prevent his giving formulation to the insight that he gleans as he peers through these narrow openings across to distant skylines.

One truth that becomes increasingly apparent is that man's life on the planet is conditioned by environing forces of nature. The exact character of those forces and their relation to one another are not altogether clear; yet their operations in relation to the human species and other forms of life are of sufficiently constant and consistent nature to suggest a Creative Order in the universe sustaining man and making for the fulfillment of his life and all life. Evidence for such an hypothesis is all about us, but two facts seem particularly persuasive: first, that the human species, through thousands of years of growing, has been sustained and promoted through organic interaction; and second, that, through disciplined devotion to what appears to be an *order of life*, humankind, in certain of its forms, has achieved a high degree of fulfillment. Many noble persons could be cited as evidence of this claim, but for one standing within the Christian tradition, this high order of fulfillment is impressively revealed in Jesus. It would not seem too much to affirm that he, being born and shaped by its processes, at once evidences the high qualitative potentialities of the cosmic process and reveals the possibilities of personal fulfillment in the universe when full devotion is attained. That the universe, or activities within its natural sphere, have produced man and sustained his species through centuries of time, and, in specific instances, given rise to personalities of high degree of integrity and sensitivity, points to a qualitative functioning within the universe. This the mystical naturalist calls the Creative Order.

A closer reading of this Creative Order suggests a still further fact about its working. Where it has produced high order of value

the imprint of its operations have been fairly well marked. Without entering meticulously into the theoretical ground of this observation, let it suffice to say that the activities that constitute this Creative Order give the suggestion of a growing organic unity in the world, emerging with increasing clarity and certainty. The course of human history reveals its broken momentum, at times an ascending force, then halted and frustrated, but again moving on to new integration and power. The simplest reading of these phenomena is to interpret them merely as historical happenings within the cultural scene. If this be the accurate reading, then we have an emerging social process that must be reckoned with. This course of interpretation leads to religious humanism, or, more definitively, a theistic humanism. The mystical naturalist views this growth as a more-than-human functioning; not an extra-human or supernatural activity, but a wider-than-human pattern, including the human, but extending beyond his efforts, weaving and shaping the many inter-related human behaviors toward a richer integration of activity. This Creative Order thus envisaged, growing toward increasing organic unity, the mystical naturalist terms *God*, believing that this reality is worthy of man's full devotion.

Given this basic object of devotion, other tentative truths begin to shape up. The guiding ethical insight is that highest value is achieved through relationships making for mutual support and meaning. Thus fulfillment of value in the ethical sense demands adjustment of human living to this growing organic unity. Value is furthered and human life enhanced in proportion as men's ways become integrated in the Creative Order of organic unity.

This growth is in evidence in various aspects of man's life. To separate them and deal with them individually is to lose something of the total meaning; but a concrete envisagement of its factors is not possible any other way. There is, for example, the physical phase of its operations bearing upon the health of the human organism. Accordingly there is a physical aspect of religious devotion, bringing the human organism into right adjustment with the Creative Order to the end that healthful relations ensue. Health, then, is a religious matter, and all the scientific insight that is available, bearing upon the problem of physical health, constitutes an aid to religious devotion in this area. This discloses man's dependence upon the physical sciences, for in this realm, they constitute the "science of God"; that is,

the collective inquiry into the working of sustaining reality in the physical sphere as it bears upon human fulfillment.

There is the psychical phase of religious devotion: bringing the mental and emotional life into right adjustment with the Creative Order to the end that a healthy integration of the personality may develop. Mental hygiene, then, is a religious matter and the psychological sciences are the sources of insight regarding the working of the Creative Order in the mental and psychical sphere.

A third aspect of religious devotion, for lack of a more definitive term, may be called the functional phase, denoting the sphere of vocational adjustment. All creatures of earth have functions peculiar to their types. Outside the human species these functions tend to be fixed through habituated responses, and the animal, acting impulsively, falls into his peculiar mode of activity without deliberation. But it is the nature of the human to assert his power of choice; and his selection is not always in accord with his talents or with the combination of circumstances that favor his fulfillment. Furthermore, many phases of society have become so maladjusted as to render the vocational problem almost hopelessly complex. Millions of men are unemployed and many more are employed in activities that frustrate, even destroy, their possibilities of fulfillment. No phase of the problem of salvation in the modern sense is more crucial than that of enabling men and women to find the form of habitual work which will serve to bring their powers to fruition. Doubtless much of the corrupt practice in modern society is traceable to the fact that too many men are in the wrong job, a point that Plato observed in analyzing Athenian society long ago. This problem will persist in any culture where undisciplined and unintelligent choice of vocation obtains. Religious devotion at the functional level, then, is bringing one's mode of work into adjustment with the Creative Order through intelligent selection of activities that give full expression to one's powers and promote one's well-being.

There is a socio-ethical aspect of religious devotion: bringing attitudes and impulses into right adjustment with the sustaining order of life to the end that a healthy integration of the individual in society may ensue; and, bringing the social structure, with its many enterprises, into adjustment with the Creative Order to the end that the fulfillment of human life might be served and the increase of organic

unity promoted. Social salvation, in one of its aspects, means bringing the individual person to social maturity. This process takes two courses of development: (1) outgrowing those traits of childhood which preclude social adaptability—a) self-centeredness; b) the inflated ego; and c) the short-range perspective; (2) preserving those traits of childhood which make for rich participation in life—a) openness toward life, issuing from the readiness to trust life; b) eagerness to experiment and to learn; and c) integrity of response, making for purity of heart. The child who comes into adulthood with these adjustments satisfactorily made, brings into society the most precious human contribution that an individual can bestow: a self capable of living the shared life creatively.

Society, as it exists, is not to be identified with the sustaining order of life uncritically. The Creative Order operates through society, but society in all its aspects is never wholly in accord with sustaining reality. Thus social salvation, in the sense of transforming and spiritualizing the social structure, is a persisting problem of first importance.

What is the function of society? In a restricted sense it is to aid in the fulfillment of human life through serving the common ends which compel men to live together in social relations. How? Through government, public utilities and other economic enterprises, through educational and recreational facilities, and through the promotion of the arts and the facilities for worship. When is this religious function impaired? When individuals, singularly or corporately, lose sight of these common ends and indulge in self-interest to the neglect of or the injury of these common ends, resulting in the abuse of government, exploitation of public utilities, widespread economic tyranny and abuse, distortion of education, commercialization or demoralization of the arts, religious controversy and persecution. Or again, the religious function of society is impaired when a select group, posing as the symbol of the whole, preclude the fulfillment of persons by crushing out the creative thoughts and efforts of individual persons and the conditions that promote such creativity, all in the interest of extending corporate control and domination. One test at least of any social organization, then, be it capitalism, communism, fascism, or socialism, is: How does it promote the religious function of society in terms of the fulfillment of persons, engaged in a shared order of living?

In its wider sense, the religious function of society is to promote

the growth of organic unity. If this objective were adequately pursued the conflict between the individual and the mass, between persons and institutions, would progressively decrease. For the values of one would tend to become the values of the other. Men and institutions, individuals and organized groups, would work toward mutual support and enhancement. This is the most significant problem now confronting us. To the degree that the vision of organic unity is perceived, and, through competent social engineering, pursued, modern culture will emerge from the dilemma of its present plight.

For most of mankind, these four phases mark the full scope of human fulfillment—a higher order, in fact, than most of them attain. But it is, after all, the biscuit-level of culture. These aspects define religious devotion in terms of science and morality, and characterize life in terms of utility values. For those who can attain them, there are two further aspects of devotion: namely, the appreciative and the mystical phase.

The appreciative aspect includes participation in both the aesthetic and the reflective interests of life. Human life has not reached a high degree of cultural fulfillment until it has become sensitive to the wealth of beauty that environs it, and aware of the profound meaning and significance of living in the cosmic environment. Salvation in this sense, then, understood as the attainment of the high order of fulfillment through adjustment and devotion to the Creative Order, means opening man's organism to the appeal of beauty, and quickening his mind to respond to the lure of the quest for truth.

The high peak of religious devotion is the mystical level, opening one's heart and mind in solitary communion to the wide reaches of cosmic association, contemplating the full significance of one's creature dependence; most important of all, envisaging with clarity and sober insight the *fact of God*, the fact of this Creative Order in the universe which sustains and promotes life, impelling one to commit himself in devotion to its demands and to the possibilities of high fulfillment through such devotion. Worship is the act of becoming reality-centered. Achieving this mystical rapport with reality to some degree, therefore, is imperative for all. But rare individuals, gifted with high sensitivity and clarity of response, may pass far beyond their contemporaries in entering into the scheme of things, may become, in fact, new creatures, capable of penetrating the vistas above the normal

vision. They become the creative bearers of the human heritage and serve to lift humanity toward its higher destiny.

Evil is a corollary of the growth of good and the fulfillment of life. In its restricted sense, bearing simply upon human interests, it constitutes anything that obstructs or impairs or destroys man's growth toward fulfillment. Taking all of earth's creatures into account, evil is of wider import.

The existence of evil may not be overlooked. Much of it can be circumvented and even eliminated through the scientific control of forces indifferent to human fulfillment. Already we have achieved impressive results along this line. There is an aspect of the problem of evil, however, which has never been given due consideration: It is the extent to which evil is magnified by man's own faulty perspective. To the human his species is of primary importance, and his fulfillment depends upon his maintaining a high estimate of his kind. But the fact is, that in the natural order man is one among many species pursuing creature ends. To the degree that he ignores this fact he tends to set the pursuit of human ends in opposition to all other creature quests. As a result, the entire non-human realm looms large as evil. Now much of this creature conflict, doubtless, is inevitable; but the supposition may be admissible that were man to take the initiative in bringing his life quest more into adjustment with the inescapable fact that *the universe is a realm of many kingdoms* and strive to reduce this conflict between human and non-human ends, the present outlook with regard to the problem of evil would be materially altered. Before the problem of evil can be adequately dealt with, this basic adjustment in the human perspective must be made. Meanwhile, we can acknowledge the existence of such conditions of evil, apart from this problem of creature relations, which can be brought under control and labor toward their circumvention.

Considered in its wider aspects, evil is that which opposes or obstructs the growth of organic unity. In this sense, the human species may constitute an imposing form of evil. Man is not inevitably evil, nor incurably so; these were exaggerations in the ancient views of human nature. But his slowness in discovering the true nature of his life, that it is integrated in a pattern of inter-related life, the motivating force of which is organic unity, has led him into a form of living that opposes the growth of good, and precludes likewise his own high

fulfillment. The past four centuries have been peculiarly productive of theories, attitudes, policies and programs which warp the human perspective and shut man out from this greater heritage. Therefore, human nature, as it now exists, institutionalized and habituated, constitutes appalling evil. The problem of coping with it is gravely complicated by the fact that the evils proceed from a variety of sources; and the effect becomes accumulative to the extent that these evils become habitually implemented in the folkways of men and in the policies of institutions.

At this point the concept evil shades into the concept *sin*. Sin may be said to be a distinctive aspect of evil, relating to man's attitudes or conduct, individual or corporate, such as willful indifference to the Creative Order that sustains, neglect of its demands through avoidable ignorance or moral lethargy. So defined, sin has both individual and social meaning; yet the two cannot always be distinguished since the individual finds fulfillment through corporate relations, and social sin has meaning largely as it discloses social practices that frustrate or prevent human fulfillment.

The term *sin* like the word *evil* is an abstraction covering many acts, attitudes, and conditions. As long as we retain the forensic pattern of thought in relating God and man, the word *sin* has concrete meaning. Sin in the Augustinian sense, as inherent willfulness that impels man more and more away from God, or in the Anselmian sense, as meaning offending God's honor, is certainly concrete. It implies breaking down the integrity of relationship between God and man, personally conceived, thereby creating an *impasse* between them. In the organic setting of the modern world view, personal relationship in the forensic sense is replaced by conditions both personal and impersonal. Now sin may be used as the abstract symbol for all willful violation or neglect of the factors that affect human fulfillment, as well as for the many errors and malconditions that arise to impair human life and its fulfillment. Another solution would be to apply the term to all *personal* situations, acts, or conditions in which choice and responsibility are involved; reserving the term *wrong-doing* for impersonal conditions over which the individual or corporate judgment has no control, yet which corrupt human attitudes and actions (errors committed out of unavoidable ignorance and maladjustments, disease, glandular disturbances, etc). The difficulty here is that the

personal and impersonal conditions overlap. There are times when a line cannot be sharply drawn between the responsible and the irresponsible act or situation. The value of retaining the word *sin*, however, is that it may help us to remain more sensitive to the factor of human responsibility in wrong-doing, and less inclined to reduce all wrong-doing to impersonal behavior resulting from mechanistic conditions over which man has no control. An emphasis upon *sin* will tend to keep these two aspects in balance.

Where the concept *God* is sharpened up to mean *the growth of organic unity*, and the concept *man* is so defined as to bring out the essential relation of human life to this divine process, the cosmic *Gestalt*, as it were, the concept *sin* takes on more concrete meaning. It returns, in fact, to its traditional meaning, implying separation from God, or in the modern sense, insulation from the fulfilling sources, mediated through nature, and from the compelling spiritual growth of the world, mediated through the social environment.

The point of view outlined in this paper is an attempt to move beyond the individualistic type of empirical thought in religion which results simply in a truncated supernaturalism, and to capture the concepts coming from organismic thought in various forms, with a view to working toward a full-blown religious naturalism. The crucial problem that must be dealt with before a philosophy of religion of this sort can be adequately formulated is the nature of man and his relation to the wider reality. I do not mean simply his psychological nature, although that, of course, is a part of the problem. I refer more particularly to what the older theologies implied in their doctrines of man, corrected and expanded in the light of our further insight. When empirical thought isolated man and his interests from this vaster cosmic aspect, it simplified the problems of religion and philosophy; but it also dismissed this crucial problem, "What is man?"

Now that the concepts *pattern* and *organic process* have come into the philosophical vocabulary, we may be approaching the time when we can re-consider this basic problem with our new perspective and with more practical meaning. Such a view of things, for example, as we get from Mead's *Social Nature of the Self*, integrated, on the one hand, with the idea of operational relations and pattern suggested in the new physics, and on the other hand, with the organismic view

of space-time as developed in certain forms of modern metaphysics, gives a key to a new doctrine of man, based upon a fuller reading of all the interacting *relations* that enter into that aspect of the pattern which we call the self, or man. That I am more than a physical body, any competent thinker today will agree. That I am more than this physical organism, ripened through years of interaction with a social environment, however, many contemporary thinkers will deny. Here then arises the problem to be dealt with: Have we envisaged the complete *pattern* which discloses man's real nature when we have examined this social self—man in relation to a social environment—or are there relations that extend beyond this empirical area, though involving and being mediated through the social environment? Were the older theologians, in other words, wrestling with a problem of *fact* in their badly formed philosophies of man, and are the Barthians likewise calling us back to that fact when they say,

> "The distinctive characteristic of the Christian doctrine (of man) is that in it man is regarded as a being whose very existence is determined by his relation to God and to his fellow-man. Man is not "in himself" a creature of a particular kind, of whom it can then be stated in addition that he also has relations with God and with his fellow-man; no, from the very outset man is conceived in his relation to God and to his fellow-man; apart from this relation he cannot be man at all; thus it is of the very essence of man's nature to be related both to God and to his fellow-man." (Emil Brunner, *Unpublished Paper*)

The "dogmatic" way is to start with God and to move toward an understanding of man and all reality. I still have confidence that the empirical path may be productive, beginning with man, and exploring his meaning in relation to the farther reaches of reality. But a naturalism that stops with simple man and abandons the quest into the farther reaches, does not, it seems to me, fulfill the promise of the empirical procedure. We might at least retain the expectant mood of search and the wistful attitude of one who feels more than he can understand.

BOOK REVIEWS

Der Buddhismus in Indien und im fernen Osten. By Helmuth von Glasenapp. Berlin: Atlantis-Verlag, 1936. 402 pp.

Die Liebe im Buddhismus und in Christentum. By Friedrich Weinrich. Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1935. ix + 115 pp. RM 5.

The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism. By Mrs. Rhys Davids. London: Luzac, 1936. xi + 444 pp. 3/6.

Indian Thought and Its Development. By Albert Schweitzer. Translated by Mrs. Charles E. B. Russell. New York: Holt, 1936. xii + 272 pp. $2.50.

It is a blessing that in these days of political turmoil, economic strain, and international anxiety, we worried Occidentals can still keep up our interest in things so remote as the ancient religions of the Orient. Whatever else the value, or lack of value, that this interest may possess, at least it helps to keep us sane. Books, wise and otherwise, on the faiths of Asia continue to drop from the press at an ever quickening pace: four of which have arrived almost simultaneously at the desk of the present reviewer.

The largest—at any rate the most bulky—of these is Helmuth von Glasenapp's "*Der Buddhismus,*" a most attractive book both within and without. It makes an immediate appeal to the book-lover by its beautiful type, excellent paper, tasteful binding, and interesting, full-page, photographic illustrations. The soul of the book is worthy of its body. It presents, in scholarly and interesting fashion, the whole story of Buddhism throughout its 2500 years, and in all the lands to which it has gone. Dr. von Glasenapp is unusually well equipped for the writing of such a book. Professor of Indologie in the University of Königsberg (formerly of Berlin), a master of Sanskrit and Pali, he has recently travelled in India and the Far East and, with the intelligent comprehension that only a deep knowledge of the past can give, has observed the present condition of Buddhism and Buddhists. The result is a book that covers more completely than any other one-volume work the whole of the Buddhist world.

It goes without saying that one cannot include so much within 400 pages except at the price of omitting intensive study of special aspects of the field. Perhaps it is the reviewer's personal interest that makes

him miss especially a longer and more critical exposition of the various forms of Buddhist philosophy and a more elaborate appraisal of their value. On these important themes the hurried author's treatment seems rather too external. He has not taken time to make the reader comprehend histrionically how it feels to be a Buddhist, nor to understand why so many very intelligent and deeply religious persons have fervently taken their refuge in the Blessed One. But it is not possible to say everything even in 400 large pages, and a purely objective exposition of the subject could hardly have been planned or carried out with better balance.

And though the book is certainly not a critical presentation of Buddhist thought, it abounds in incidental insights of a philosophical nature. Thus it is suggested that the contrasted emphases of Christianity on faith and of Buddhism on knowledge may be in part traced to the fact that Christianity was born among the lower classes of society and only gradually rose to the attention of the educated, the mighty, and the wise, whereas the Buddha and the great majority of his earliest followers belonged to the cultivated aristocracy, and his teaching only gradually percolated into the masses. Similarly the curious fact that all the sects of Chinese Buddhism were founded between the fifth and the eighth centuries is made more significant for the reader because the author points out that it was exactly in those centuries that Indian Buddhism, then at its height, was in direct contact with China. Professor von Glasenapp's treatment of Japanese Buddhism is particularly good, especially the justice with which he describes the great indebtedness of Japan to China and India, and, on the other hand, the modifications (notably the introduction of the nationalistic spirit) which the Japanese have wrought in Buddhism.

Professor von Glasenapp, as has been said, approaches his subject in the purely objective manner of the historian. He is plainly very much interested in Buddhism as an object of study: but whether or not he likes it as a religion he does not indicate. Far different is the attitude of the second of the books under review. Friedrich Weinrich begins his treatment on love in Buddhism and Christianity in a way that leads the reader to expect a steady eulogium for both religions. The hymn in praise of love, from the 13th Chapter of 1st Corinthians, and the hymn in praise of love from the Itivuttaka are quoted at length. They seem very much alike. But are they? It is

Weinrich's aim to show that the Buddhist conception of love (*"maitri"*) and the Christian (*"agape"*) are extremely different. With this in view he assembles and examines the more important passages in the Buddhist canon which have reference to "love," and compares the resulting meaning with the love praised by St. Paul. His conclusion is that for the Buddhist love is of value only as a means of emancipation, whereas the *agape* of Christianity is of value in itself. For the Buddhist genuine love toward others is always regarded as a danger and as something to be avoided. "Let no man love anyone," says the Dhammapada; "loss of the beloved is evil. Those who love nothing and hate nothing have no fetters." The praises of love in such passages as the famous hymn in the Itivuttaka, the author assures us, are not intended as praises of love in the Christian sense, but as praises of meditation upon love. It is helpful toward one's own emancipation to sit alone and cultivate feelings of good will to all sentient beings; but one should not really feel love in a sense that will either prompt one to act for the welfare of others or endanger one's own peace of mind. Actual active helpfulness is no part of the Buddha's ideal. Such is Weinrich's conclusion, and, as has been indicated, it is a conclusion in support of which he is able to cite chapter and verse.

If the question were of the kind that could be settled by chapter and verse, without reference to the whole character of the Founder and his religion as they are shown to us in many other ways, one might be led to follow the author's severe conclusion. But more things than the literal assertions of particular verses are here involved. As von Glasenapp points out, there are many passages in which the Founder urges his disciples not only to meditate on love but to act for the welfare of others—for the welfare of all beings. If Gotama had believed only in meditation "surely he would not have continued his unwearied journeys down to old age through the tropical heats and the dusty roads of northern India, in order to spread abroad his saving gospel; and if the community had honored in him only the passive thinker, lost in meditation, it would not have pictured him in the Jataka stories as shedding his love, in over five hundred previous existences, upon all living things through unintermitting helpfulness."

It is not to be denied that the contrast between the condemnation of love in the verses cited by Weinrich, and the actual life of the Founder presents the student of Buddhism with a real problem. It

may be that the more self-centered part of Gotama's teaching came from his coldly intellectual analysis of the human situation, while his indubitable compassion had its source in his heart, and that the two are not entirely reconcilable. Further light may perhaps be found from a more careful analysis of love. To the Buddha love plainly meant neither romantic attachment, nor even that form of tender fondness which exists in the finer sort of friendship between men. For him it seems to have meant a kind of impersonal good will—an eagerness to help at any price those who are in need, but without the emotional sort of attachment that commonly goes with it. The question may, indeed, be raised whether this be not all that is intended by the Christian *agape*—in both First Corinthians and the Fourth Gospel.

This is perhaps the solution of the seeming contradictions in the Buddhist canon. Yet it cannot be denied that the condemnation of personal and family affection found at times in the canonical writings, the extreme praises of the non-social monastic life, the self-centeredness of many of the expressions of the Founder as given us in the Tripitaka and the Sutta Nipata are still very hard to harmonize with other equally authoritative passages and with nearly everything that is told us of his actual practice. These facts at least raise the query whether there may not be in the Buddhist canon two strands of tradition coming from quite different sources.

That this is the case is the long-matured conviction of Mrs. Rhys Davids. During the last ten years she has been writing—and rewriting—books, both scholarly and popular, to show that the Buddhist Canon in its present form is in effect a palimpsest, its original teaching overlaid by the accretion of centuries of monastic modification. She is the first to acknowledge that no other Pali scholars of repute have come out boldly for this view. "Always is there an absence of seeing that *between* the birth of a new religious mandate, starting between B.C. 600 and 500, and its 'scriptures,' even the earliest known of such, dating apparently as 'holy writ' from some four to five hundred years later, it was humanly necessary that very considerable changes in religious values must have come to pass, and have influenced the form and tone and emphases visible in those scriptures."

But can we go behind our ancient texts and correct them? Nearly all Pali scholars, including Professor von Glasenapp in the book we have just reviewed, deny our right to question the age-long Buddhist

tradition and our oldest written sources. How, they ask, can we distinguish the Founder's teaching from the form in which it is presented to us? To which Mrs. Rhys Davids replies: "It is something gained that a distinction of the kind is worded as an ideal possibility. The next thing is to make an attempt to distinguish. For it is incredible that there is no distinction to make, so only it could be made." Whether there are indications within the Pali texts of an original teaching warped out of shape by the long generations of monks is a question which can be decided only by earnest and scholarly attempts to find out. And in half a dozen books and twice as many articles Mrs. Rhys Davids has been leading the way, almost single-handed, in this daring adventure.

The book under review is, as its subheading relates, "a rewritten and enlarged edition of 'Buddhist Psychology,' published in 'The Quest' Series, London 1914; republished 1924." The early "Buddhist Psychology" has been not only rewritten but revolutionized. The new title is significant: "The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism." For the study of her problem concerning the earliest Buddhist teaching has led the author to enlarge her field and to give a new and analytic study to the Upanishads. The method she uses is largely the careful study of words in their original significance, and the critical analysis of passages with an eye to their mutual consistency. Her argument has, of course, varying degrees of strength upon different parts of the problem. It is at its strongest in attacking the *anatta* (or no-self) doctrine of traditional Buddhism, a subject upon which the majority of the important canonical passages seem to be upon her side (although it must be said that both Professor von Glasenapp and Dr. Schweitzer, like most Western scholars, accept without argument the *anatta* doctrine).

The outcome of her investigations, so far as they have gone, is found in the conclusion that in the earliest Upanishads the new conception of *becoming*, of growth and progressive change, presses gradually but significantly to the fore; the conception that man is not merely a static being but includes a divine More; that this as yet vague notion of man and his becoming was seized upon and developed by Gotama and made central to his thought: that he shared the Upanishadic belief in a real self, its growing possibilities and even its essential divinity; but that the centuries during which his teachings were

handed down through the memories and under the influence of small-minded, scholastic, unappreciative, monks saw passive and analysable mind-states substituted for the active self, the ideal of static being substituted for that of becoming, and becoming interpreted not as growth but as degeneration. Thus the Founder "is shown as a teacher of Man-in-the-Less, that is, of man as just body and mind—he who had from the first warned the man, he was not just and only that. . . . He is made to hold out, not his own aim or goal: the thing needed and sought, of the life beyond; but the monk goal of a waning-out into an emptiness that is not-Man." . . . and much more to the same effect. To Mrs. Rhys Davids it seems incredible that a teacher whose message was nothing but the timid, despairing, passive, negative sort of thing we find in the Pali Scriptures when taken just as they stand could ever have turned so large a part of the world upside-down and become for 2500 years the "Light of Asia."

Albert Schweitzer is as interested in the problem of the contradictions within the Buddhist Canon as are either Weinrich or Mrs. Rhys Davids. The Buddha, he tells us, gives us a "magnificent theoretical ethic of compassion and kindness," but omits wholly to inculcate the sort of action which should carry out these sentiments. "Observe: not a word of the aid due to the suffering in their need! When the Buddha speaks of charity, he means liberality to monks!" His ethical teaching "has such strong instincts toward activity, that it is incomprehensible how the Buddha could think it could be combined with the principle of non-activity."

But although these two tendencies are so diverse that it is for Schweitzer "incomprehensible" how they could be combined in the Buddha's mind, he thinks that somehow they were: and to make the process more comprehensible he has recourse to the formula which runs through his entire volume: the antithesis, namely, between "world and life negation" and "world and life affirmation."

"World and life negation" has long been attributed to Indian thought and religion as such. But Schweitzer properly points out that no such sweeping characterization is justified. The Vedas and the Brahmanas have little of such negation, but are almost entirely on the side of "world and life affirmation." Negation begins to show itself in the late hymns and gradually deepens and spreads in the

Brahmanas and Upanishads. The method of its origin which Schweitzer suggests is rather surprising. "The simplest hypothesis is that the Aryans were originally all followers of world and life affirmation, and that world and life negation originated among the Brahmins under the influence of being exalted above this world which was developed from magic-religious ideas and the experience of ecstasy." In the Upanishads, under the influence of the new mystical *Weltanschauung* which identified all souls (not merely Brahmins) with Brahman, "world and life negation" tended to spread to all classes.

The Upanishadic conception of the identity of all sentient things with the Supreme Life Principle left little room for the doctrine of reincarnation; and in fact, according to Schweitzer, this doctrine plays a very small part in the Upanishads and is really incompatible with their central thought. It was only in the sixth century that the belief in rebirth took on huge proportions and raised in a new form the longing for redemption and release. And it is here that the Buddha enters the picture.

In contrast to Mrs. Rhys Davids, Schweitzer states quite dogmatically that the Buddha rejected wholly the Upanishadic doctrine of the divine element of the soul. He accepted, however, not only the doctrine of transmigration, but also "world and life negation." Transmigration was closely connected, for him, with the moral life, and his own essentially ethical point of view he attempted to graft upon "world and life negation." "The importance of the Buddha consists in his having undertaken to spiritualize world and life negation and make it ethical. He spiritualized it by teaching men to regard the detachment of the heart from material things as more important than the renunciation of the world in actual practice. At the same time he required of his disciples that their inward emancipation from the world should be outwardly expressed in ethical conduct. Because his thinking was dominated by world and life negation it followed that for him the ethic of active help did not come under consideration. So he was obliged to take no account of this exoteric ethic and could only concern himself with the esoteric ethic of that disposition free from hatred, peaceable and kind, which it is man's duty to strive to acquire and to put to the proof in his dealings with other men. Thus he became the creator of the ethic of inner perfection." He believed that

life negation could be combined with earnest moral endeavor. This, according to Schweitzer, was his great mistake.

The very deep-lying problem of seemingly incompatible teachings within Buddhism, which occupies so central a place in three of the four books under review, has left us no space for consideration of several other matters which should have been dealt with here—notably, Mrs. Rhys Davids' careful analysis of the concepts of Buddhist Psychology and her discussion of the chronological order of their appearance, and Dr. Schweitzer's exposition of the relations between active morality and the mystical world-view, and also his interesting presentation of the religious thought of India and of its leaders in recent years. For these matters the reader must be referred to the books themselves. Important as they are, it seemed best that they should make room for the central philosophical problem of Buddhist scholarship.

James Bissett Pratt

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Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut, 1874-1933. Edited by Salo W. Baron and Alexander Marx. New York: Block Publishing Co. (For the Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation), 1935. xciii + 614 + 146 (in Hebrew) pp. $7.50.

This collection of contributions to the scientific exploration of Jewish history, literature, philosophy, and religion is remarkable for the high quality no less than for the abundance of its contents. It is destined to be widely sought and consulted by scholars concerned with Biblical and rabbinic literature, as well as by others specializing in medieval and modern Hebrew prose and poetry. Among the forty-odd studies there are, for example, four valuable investigations in Jewish scholasticism: Z. Diesendruck, "Saadya's Formulation of the Time-Argument for Creation," pp. 145-58; J. Guttmann, "Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Hasdai Crescas und den islamischen Aristotelikern," pp. 325-49; I. Husik, "Averroes on the Metaphysics of Aristotle," pp. 370-08; H. A. Wolfson, "Isaac Israeli on the Internal Senses," pp. 583-98. The field of history is not as well represented as the other subjects, although the volume does contain a good-sized monograph on Polish-Jewish economic history by P. Friedmann, "Wirtschaftliche Umschichtungsprozesse und Industrialisier-

ung in der polnischen Judenschaft 1800-1870," pp. 178-247. In addition, interesting light on the background of the Zionist movement from a document in the archives of the British Foreign Office is offered by S. W. Baron, "Abraham Benisch's Project for Jewish Colonization in Palestine (1842)," pp. 72-85. The *Gelehrtengeschichte* of the same century is enriched by the following articles: J. Bloch, "Some observations, etc., A Hebrew letter by Kaufmann Kohler to Alexander Kohut," pp. 109-13; A. Marx, "Steinschneideriana II," pp. 492-527; M. Schorr, "Aus einem Briefwechsel betreffend Benjacob's *Oṣar Ha-Sefarim*," pp. 528-48.

The majority of the readers of this journal, however, will perhaps be more interested in the several articles which are primarily devoted to aspects of the Jewish religion. Two of these have a bearing on the important problem of the relation of early Christianity to the Jewish life of that day. L. Baeck, "Das Dritte Geschlecht," pp. 40-46, discusses the expression *tertium genus, i.e.*, the Christians, which occurs in Greek and Latin writings of the second century. The phrase indicates how the Christians distinguished themselves sharply from the more powerful religious groups, the Jews and pagans, and has been treated at length in Harnack's *Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the first three Centuries*. Baeck attempts to trace the phrase to a Jewish source, and there is no doubt that corresponding Hebrew expressions are employed in the contemporary literature to differentiate Judaism from the Emperor-cult on the one hand and from the dualistic religions on the other. Its appropriation by the new faith, the writer claims, is due to the fact that the Christians claimed to be the true Israel. The point is a good one, especially in its indication of an underlying analogy between the two minority religions, both confronted with the same alien world. To speak of borrowing, however, seems to introduce an unnecessary hypothesis in this instance. The basis of the argument is, after all, a set of expressions each consisting of nothing more than a common noun qualified by an ordinal numeral, and under such circumstances the problem of influence can scarcely be considered capable of solution.

A broader question is raised by R. Travers Herford, "The Problem of the 'Minim' further considered," pp. 359-69. The term *min* is an indefinite Hebrew word connoting an heretical person, but it is Herford's theory that these *minim* who figure in rabbinic literature were

predominantly "Jewish Christians." The Jewish believers in the Messiahship of Jesus, he holds, remained on friendly terms with the rest of Jewry until a considerable number of Gentiles became converted to the new religion. The non-Jewish Christians tended toward the apotheosis of Jesus, and by the beginning of the second century that un-Jewish doctrine apparently had come, says Herford, to be accepted by the "Jewish Christians." As soon as the main body of Jewry sensed this, the believers in Jesus the Messiah were no longer tolerated; as *minim* they became subject to excommunication and saved themselves only by concealing their heretical doctrine. Now, if there were available some proof of an increase in the number of Jesus' followers within Palestinian Jewry after the crucifixion, the suggestion made by Herford would be in order. However, it is undeniable that in the century following the death of Jesus Christianity won its triumphs in regions outside of Palestine, and no writer, Jewish or Christian, of that period gives any explicit indication of the persistence of devotees of Jesus *within* the Jewry of Palestine. Such being the case, it would seem to be preferable in general to leave the role of the "Jewish Christians" in abeyance; any argument which assumes that they were an element to be reckoned with in Palestine inevitably involves a *petitio principii*.[1] Furthermore, as Herford points out, the later rabbinic texts show a decrease of bitterness against the *minim*, and, on the other hand, according to Jerome, there were *Minaei* in all the synagogues of the East, as late as the beginning of the fifth century. But in this period these "Jewish Christians" had already been repudiated by the Church—and consequently tolerated by the Synagogue, argues Herford! This is an even more striking suggestion than the main point of the article, and it would certainly be interesting to have some evidence to justify the opinion that a Jew could endorse the Messiahship of Jesus in Jerome's day and still be tolerated in the synagogue. Herford does not reckon with the strong probability, accepted by Poznanski, Harkavy, and others, that these *minim* were the forerunners of the Karaites, whose views on Jesus played, of course, an entirely insignificant role.

The critical survey by R. Marcus, "Recent Literature on Philo

[1] See D. W. Riddle, "The so-called Jewish Christians," *Anglican Theological Review*, XII (1929), pp. 15-33. Cf. V. Aptowitzer, *Monats. f. d. Gesch. u. Wiss. d. Juden.*, LXXIV (1930), pp. 108-15.

(1924-34)," pp. 463-91, renders a valuable service. The output in this field is steadily rising and he who would study all of it must read Hebrew as well as Polish (and Hungarian[2]). Over forty monographs are discussed, so that the reader emerges with a fairly adequate idea of the status of research in this field. Marcus' concluding summary, in which he indicates the neglected aspects in the study of Philo, is further proof that his grasp of the subject goes far beyond that of the bibliographer. His admiration for the works of Bréhier and Heinemann as well as his strictures on Goodenough[3] will undoubtedly be shared by most authorities. As Marcus recognizes, his bibliography is incomplete, and though he has not omitted anything of importance, it is regrettable that he cites only three reviews of the books he mentions. It may also be noted that Momigliano's article (no. 21), which was not accessible to him, represents an attempt to fix the dates of writing of the *Legatio* and the *In Flaccum ca.* 41 and after 53, respectively, with the aid of the so-called "Acts of the Pagan Martyrs." Assuming that there is some virtue in a closer approximation to exhaustiveness, a few references, all within the decade covered by the survey, are added here to Marcus' list: Robbins, F.E., "Arithmetic in Philo Judaeus," *Classical Philology*, XXVI (1931), pp. 345-61. Hadidian, Y. H., "Philonism in the Fourth Gospel," *D. B. MacDonald Presentation Volume* (Princeton, 1933), pp. 213-22. Adler, M., "Zu Philo Alexandrinus," *Ἐπιτύμβιον' Heinrich Swoboda Dargebracht* (Reichenberg, 1929), pp. 15-17. Reiter, S., *Ἀρετή* und der Titel von Philos 'Legatio,' *ibid.*, pp. 228-37. Kershner, F. D., *Pioneers of Christian Thought* (Indianapolis, 1930), c. I. Bardy, G., "Philon le Juif," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XII, cols. 1439-56. Most students would probably have preferred a topical arrangement of the writings included in the survey, rather than the purely chronological one employed by Marcus.

A most curious Jewish custom is the subject of a thoroughgoing study by J. Z. Lauterbach, "The Ritual for the *Kapparot*-Ceremony," pp. 413-22. The Hebrew term is recognizable from its better known

[2] Vidor, Pál. "A gōrōg és a zsidó gondolat talalkozása Philon bölcseleté ben." *Magyar zsidó szemle*, XLIX (1932), pp. 322-48. While unable to read the language, the reviewer finds that the title may be translated "The encounter of Greek and Jewish thought in Philo's philosophy."

[3] See now Marcus' review of *By Light, Light*, *American Journal of Philology*, LVII, pp. 203-05.

cognate *Kippur*, the ceremony being performed in orthodox homes on the eve of the Day of Atonement. As will presently appear, the procedure and its immediate implications are extraordinarily primitive, and Lauterbach has since published a most searching investigation of the background of the ceremony, which in his view was originally part of another performed a few days earlier, on the second day of the New Year.[4] The *Kapparot*-ceremony is perhaps best described in a seventh-century text cited by Lauterbach in the Hebrew only: "The cantor takes hold of the cock and rests his hand on its head. Thus he grasps it, places it on the head of the man atoning, and recites: 'This one in place of the other, this one in exchange for the other, this one is beheaded on behalf of the other.' He then swings the cock above the man and they recite, etc. (A number of Biblical verses, including 'I have found a ransom,' Job 33:24, and 'A life for a life.') This is done seven times, after which the cantor places his hand on the head of the cock and says, 'This one is to die in place of the other.' Then placing his hand on the head of the man atoning he says, 'Enter, A son of B, into life for thou shalt not die.' This is done thrice, after which the man atoning places his hand on the head of the cock, etc." In his interpretation Lauterbach makes out a strong case for taking this ceremony as a revival of the Biblical scapegoat sacrifice, especially since an alternative animal in the foregoing ritual was a goat or a ram.

To the same general field of research belongs A. Büchler, "Moed Katan III, 7 in the interpretation of the Babylonian Geonim," pp. 114-44. The customs or laws involved in this passage of the Mishnah are defined thus: "Only the near relatives of the departed shall rend [their clothes], bare [their shoulders] and be served the mourner's meal. They serve [the mourner the first meal] from a couch standing upright . . ." Büchler points out that the first sentence refers more likely to any weekday, rather than, as is commonly supposed, to the semi-festive intermediate days of Passover and Tabernacles, and calls attention to the lapse of observance of the peculiar Palestinian forms of mourning for the dead, such as the baring of the shoulder, public lamentation, and the mourner's meal, among Babylonian Jews. The abundance of relevant detail and the careful logical procedure of the writer evokes one's spontaneous admiration.

Another solid contribution to the analysis of religious life of

[4] "Tashlik," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XI, pp. 207-340.

medieval Jewry is that of H. J. Zimmels, "Nachtalmudische Fasttage," pp. 599-614. His introduction reviews the subject of Jewish fast-days in general, and the body of the article presents a fully documented list of those later fasts which the author has found in a wide canvass of the relevant sources. His material is well grouped but he has neglected to formulate his results in convenient form. However, it is easy enough to see that these medieval fasts developed chiefly along two lines: a. The expansion of an historical fast-day, such as the Ninth of Ab, so that it was observed on the day following as well; b. As an intensified expression of the solemnity felt during a given season, such as the interim between the New Year and the Day of Atonement. With the Jewish materials for this purpose so conveniently available it would be interesting if some scholar cast about for further illumination of the phenomena involved in the surrounding Gentile environment, which seems in this instance to be chiefly France and Germany, in the twelfth to eighteenth centuries. The abundance of available data on Christian asceticism would seem to invite such a comparative study.

The Jewish aspect of an intricate folklore theme is treated by B. Heller, "Gog und Magog im jüdischen Schrifttum," pp. 350-58. Building upon A. R. Anderson's *Alexander's Gate*, etc., the author claims that whereas there is no conclusive proof that the union of the Gog-Magog cycle with the motif of Alexander's Wall is of Jewish origin, the Christian and Moslem legends are *beigemischt* with Jewish elements. His control of the vast body of ancient material and of the relevant scholarly writings is highly gratifying.

Of the various Biblical studies included in this volume mention should be made of a complete edition, translation and commentary of a brief section of the Old Testament by C. C. Torrey, "The Prophecy of Habakkuk," pp. 565-82. The author rejects the accepted dating[5] and contends that the denunciations are directed against Alexander the Great. And indeed, if Torrey's earlier attempt to lower the dating of Ezekiel to the same period is considered successful, this would follow as a corollary. However, confining ourselves specifically to the question of detecting veiled references to Alexander, the refutation of

[5] For the most recent study supporting the assignment of Habakkuk to the end of the seventh century see E. Täubler, "Zur Interpretation des Propheten Habakkuk", *Minhat Torah, Max Dienemann zum 60. Geburstag gewidmet*, Frankfort, 1935, pp. 93-102.

Torrey by Spiegel with regard to the more famous prophet's book[6] will hold here as well.

In the Hebrew section attention must be directed to Ch. Tschernowitz, "*Demai* (An Historical Interpretation of the Reforms of the High Priest John [Hyrcanus, 135-05] recorded in the Mishnah)," pp. 46-58. The interesting point made in this article is that the reforms attributed to John Hyrcanus reflect a policy of favoring the priestly class at the expense of the Levites. Thus, according to the author's interpretation of the Mishnaic passage in question (Ma'aser Sheni, V, 15), the Levites were deprived of their time-honored control of the keys to the Temple area as well as of part of their share to the prescribed offerings of produce.

In conclusion the reviewer would congratulate the editors of this rich volume on their share in its production. With contributors scattered in all quarters of the globe and with 850 pages of polyglot material involved, it is indeed an achievement to have published a volume free of all but a comparative handful of typographical and stylistic errors.

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The Anabaptists: Their Contribution to Our Protestant Heritage. By R. J. Smithson. London: James Clarke & Co., Ltd., 1935. 228 pp. 5/ .

In this account of Anabaptism from the Reformation to our times, Dr. Smithson has two purposes: to provide a history of the movement and to show its value for Christians. He accomplishes the second of these purposes better than the first. The value of primitive Christianity and the assistance of the Anabaptists in reviving it and handing it down are satisfactorily reestablished. Scholars, like Rufus Jones, had not ignored these matters, but the spiritual services of the Anabaptists have been generally obscured by those of their indirect descendants, the Quakers and the British Baptists, and by the abuse which many of the Anabaptists deserved by their conduct. Many authorities have neglected the piety for the fanaticism or the social and economic ambitions of the Anabaptists. The attempt of Dr. Smithson to free

[6] *Harvard Theological Review*, XXIV (1931), pp. 292-4.

the Anabaptists from the scandal of Münster in order to reveal our spiritual debt to them is commendable; but his attempt to correct past partiality by an equal and opposite partiality is to do small service to scholarship. His book is less pleasing to the historian than to the evangelical apologist.

Anabaptism of the sixteenth century was a general movement of many divisions, some radical, some moderate, all of which, however, desired to return to primitive Christianity and preferred believers' baptism. The social and millenarian ideals of the radicals found expression in John of Leyden's kingdom of saints at Münster. The destruction of these immoderate men left the movement in the hands of their blameless brethren who, as Mennonites and Moravians, have carried the tenets of the primitive church to our times, and who exerted an influence upon the antinomian sects of seventeenth-century England. The adherence of the Anabaptists to the essentials is often considered more perfect than that of Luther and Calvin, their enemies, and deserves the applause of Christians.

This applause is Dr. Smithson's important contribution. But in addition he traces the origins of Anabaptism among the heresies of the middle ages, reviews its rise in reformation Switzerland, its exuberance in Germany and the Netherlands, and its decline to our day, noting its connections with the English sects, and celebrating the principles of its less celebrated leaders. These subjects had been covered by recent historians such as Richard Heath, Belfort Bax, Thomas Lindsay, Charles Beard, and W. T. Whitley, all of whom with many others appear in Dr. Smithson's bibliography. Dr. Smithson has added little but emphasis to the work of these men, upon whom he relies, to the neglect of original sources. The convenience to the casual reader which a summary of this scholarship might be expected to afford is lost through Dr. Smithson's pursuit of a thesis so narrow as to involve the neglect of established but unsuitable facts.

Anabaptism reflected the social and economic discontent as well as the spiritual ideals of the sixteenth century. Sometimes this discontent appeared in secular peasant rebellions. More generally it appeared under the symbols of religion, which offered the most convenient expression to secular as well as to spiritual desires. Bax and Kautsky, who have emphasized, perhaps over-emphasized, the social and eco-

nomic element in Anabaptism, are rejected by Dr. Smithson, who holds that though certain imperfect Anabaptists may have had economic motives, the motives of true Anabaptists were "altogether religious." It is agreed that a generous share of spirit can be found in the Anabaptist, as in every sectarian of the time, but as Tawney and others have shown, it is impossible without injury to isolate this better part from the social and economic considerations with which it was usually involved and with which it is not incompatible. The rise of the Anabaptists, like the parallel and later rise of the Quakers, Ranters, and Baptists, was almost as much a social as a religious phenomenon. To the opponents of the sects in the seventeenth century as to recent scholars, who have examined the sectarian pamphlets of England and the surviving records of Anabaptism, this has been apparent. That Dr. Smithson found it necessary to deny the social in order to advance the spiritual contributions of the Anabaptists is to be regretted.

Dr. Smithson is equally intent upon removing the stigma of enthusiasm, especially millenarian enthusiasm, from the Anabaptists. Enthusiasm is the ordinary accompaniment of religious awakenings, and millenarianism has been far from unusual in Christian history. The Münster Anabaptists followed the ideals of the inner light and of the millennium to an unfortunate but logical conclusion as Venner was to do in England. Dr. Smithson holds that Münster was an "excrescence" upon an otherwise sober movement rather than its central manifestation, the natural result of primitive Christian ideals and of economic necessity. No useful end is served by this effort to impart respectability to a movement which could have arisen only through the energy of enthusiasm. It is true, as he says, that not all early Anabaptists were fanatics, but it is improper to deny notice to all but the moderate. After the fall of Münster and during the persecution which followed, as after the failure of Venner's millennium, the enthusiasm of the survivors prudently declined. The prudence of the remnant rather than the fanaticism of those who were discouraged or destroyed served to propagate the more harmless tenets of primitive Christianity, as Dr. Smithson says, but prudence was not the principal characteristic of the movement, as he would have us believe. It is a pity that he permitted his own enthusiasm to injure an otherwise valu-

able book, which deserves to be commended for calling attention once more to a spiritual debt.

WILLIAM Y. TINDALL

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Religion and Learning: a Study in English Presbyterian Thought from the Bartholomew Elections (1662) to the Foundation of the Unitarian Movement. By OLIVE M. GRIFFITHS. Cambridge: At the University Press, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935. viii + 202 pp. 12/6.

The modification of Presbyterian orthodoxy in the generations following the Act of Uniformity of 1662 and similar legislation of the Restoration is sketched in this book with considerable competence. The Presbyterians had hoped, under the early Stuarts and at the outset of political strife in the 1640's, to remodel the Church of England in accord with their theories of ecclesiastical policy. But after 1662 they found themselves in the unwelcome status of Dissenters. Laxity in the enforcement of the restrictive laws left to most of them opportunities for study, for quiet worship, and for the education of their sons, even if certain individuals among them met cruel hardship. Excluded from the two old English universities, they could send their sons to Holland or to Scotland, at which intellectual centers their sons came into touch with the most liberal currents of thought of the time. They were also in contact with scientific developments in England, felt the influence of Descartes and Locke and the work of the Royal Society, and knew the ideas that were spread abroad in the physiological and psychological researches that became more numerous as the eighteenth century passed. As a result of these many intellectual forces, the Presbyterians gradually espoused various forms of Arminianism, Arianism, Socinianism, and (in the early nineteenth century) Unitarianism. Thus they abandoned doctrines of total depravity and predestination and accepted ideas of the natural dignity of man, the power of human will, and the value of good works as a means to salvation. They held firmly to the right of private interpretation of Scripture and hence came to question the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. After a period of Christological controversy, the number of orthodox Presbyterian chapels was barely half what it had once been: the orthodox Pres-

byterians had probably over 500 chapels in 1700 and only 252 in 1812. During this decline in Presbyterian orthodoxy, many heterodox Presbyterians found the latitudinarianism of the Established Church an obvious refuge, and more than a hundred important Presbyterian foundations passed into the hands of congregations who had accepted a Unitarian theology.

This account of Presbyterian history is richly documented and usually convincing. But some questions keep arising to disturb a reader. For example, is there evidence that many Presbyterians followed Priestley in accepting either materialism or philosophical necessity? One can mention a few writers who followed him; but how about the great mass of Presbyterians? Indeed can one properly speak of "Presbyterian opinion" as one homogeneous thing? Is one entitled to say of the Unitarians of the early nineteenth century that "they believed that the career of each individual was designed by the Creator to fulfil a preordained purpose and that no man was responsible for his own acts" (p. 156)? Is this not to take Coleridge's indictment too trustingly? Again, is concern for such social causes as the abolition of slavery and progress of education among backward peoples really inconsistent with the kind of "rationalism" which Unitarians manifested? May not a rationalist have intense emotion over and enthusiasm for the principles which his rationalism has led him to espouse?

On its philosophical side the present book is rather weak. It contends that the exclusion of Presbyterians from the Established Church and the consequent anomaly in their status were the causes which led the Presbyterians to examine the foundations of their faith and to reach the new positions they adopted in ensuing generations. Such an assertion raises the problem of what "cause" means in historical analysis. Strangely enough the present book also remarks that the "failure of the Unitarians to assimilate the newest developments of thought was certainly due in part to their struggle for existence" (p. 160)! Exposure to legal penalties and social ostracism is used to "explain" both the reexamination of Presbyterian fundamentals and arrested development among Unitarians! Moreover, the same liberal tendencies which marked English Presbyterianism from 1662 to 1900 can be found in the Established Church too,—else why, indeed, could the latitudinarianism of the Established Church be mentioned as a refuge

for the more unitarian Presbyterians of the early nineteenth century? Men did not need to be forced into the unwelcome status of Dissenters to become aware of the new scientific work of Boyle and Newton, the warfare of Locke against intolerance and trinitarian orthodoxy, the attack of Henry More against Calvinism and its ethical consequences, or the arguments of Samuel Clarke which provided a philosophical basis for Arianism. For Boyle and Newton, Locke, Henry More, Clarke, and other such liberals were good members of the Established Church. Indeed it was such Anglican leaders rather than the more occasional Dissenter like Priestley through whom the liberalizing of Presbyterianism was chiefly effected. In Holland and in Scotland the dissenting Presbyterians came under influences that stood outside the Church of England. But did not these foreign influences accomplish much within the Church of England too?

The present book is, it might fairly be said, a bit too eager to lead up to its closing sentence, according to which Presbyterians succeeded in combining scientific examination of new truths with due reverence for old beliefs and so "found the mean in religious thought which can never be safely ignored" (p. 166). Yet the book is a good one. It is only in detail that its historical record is inadequate. And if it is weak on the philosophical side, so are the works of historians generally.

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Connop Thirwall, by JOHN CONNOP THIRWALL, JR. London: S.P.C.K., 1936. 271 pp.

This precise, accurate and interesting work on Connop Thirwall, (1797-1875), the foremost liberal of the Victorian Church, is both timely and instructive. Previous to this biography our knowledge of Thirwall was very limited. The materials were widely scattered and largely inaccessible. The edition of his *Letters* (ed. Perowne and Stokes, 1881) contained a rather defective memoir and many important sidelights on his work and character were only to be gleaned after tedious research from the published lives and correspondence of eminent Victorians. All this has now been remedied by a complete biography from the pen of his descendant, John Connop Thirwall, Jr., who has ably fulfilled his task. Well documented and abounding

in carefully selected citations from letters and other sources, his book makes informative, if not always easy, reading.

It is a happy occasion that the life of Thirwall should appear in the year that celebrates the fourth centenary of Erasmus. These two theologians have much in common in spirit and in temperament, both being ardent champions of enlightened and scholarly faith.

It is an even happier circumstance that this most eminent liberal of the Church of England should have found a biographer at a time when liberalism is being assailed from every quarter. So much modern theology is passionately concerned with contradicting the liberal elements in our culture, with a complete disregard of the debt which we owe to the impartial and courageous search for truth that characterised the "liberal era." It is so easy to take for granted those hard-won battles of our fathers against obscurantism and bigotry, and to point merely to the errors which such victories brought with them. The biography of Thirwall may give us pause to consider how recently our own religious thought has been liberated from unenlightened tradition. For though Thirwall's battles were fought against the self-satisfied ignorance of the Church of England and its supreme indifference to continental philosophy and theology, American thought owes not a little to the same spirit which is evident in the champions of liberalism in the nineteenth century.

The most unfortunate thing about Connop Thirwall is that he has been so quickly forgotten. His biographer has thus rendered a significant service in rescuing him from this undeserved neglect. In his lifetime Thirwall enjoyed a reputation in scholarship and ecclesiastical statesmanship second to none. Though a man by nature reflective and suited for the quiet life of scholarship, he played an important part in all the significant controversies of his day: indeed, not a few of these issues owe their origin to the words and acts of Thirwall himself.

It was the supreme irony of his life that he should have been the centre of strife when he longed for the peace of the college window. It is equally ironical that he should have been elevated to the episcopate of St. David's, and have been forced into an active work among the illiterate in a locality as wild and uncivilized as he himself was dignified and scholarly. The vision of the bishop reading to his rude and untutored clergy Charges which were masterpieces of wise and informed judgment is somewhat ridiculous.

Yet, strangely enough, irony was a basic trait in his own character and is reflected in all his controversial works. He disposes of opponents not with defaming their characters or shrieking hysterically at them, but with shrewd and biting irony (*cf.* pp. 73 ff. and 235). For instance, during the struggle over the admission of Dissenters to the University, he had written sharply against compulsory chapel services. Wordsworth, in reply, had contended that there were only two alternatives—compulsory religion at college or no religion at all. Thirwall pointedly remarked,

> "I cannot indeed draw such delicate distinctions as my friend seems to make in this passage; for as the epithet compulsory applied to religion appears to me contradictory, the difference between compulsory religion and no religion at all is too subtle for my mental grasp." (p. 74)

Some of the sarcastic retorts to his clergy are equally amusing. To quote,

> "To the demonstration of a curate who wished to hold two livings that the towns were only twenty miles apart 'as the crow flies', Thirwall briefly replied, 'Mr. Brown, are you a crow?'" (p. 127)

Thirwall was essentially majestic and solitary, and though a more intimate side of his character is revealed in the *Letters to a Friend* (*i.e.*, Miss Betha Johnes), his biographer rightly remarks, "His friends might respect, they seldom could love him" (p. 267). Perhaps this loneliness is not unconnected with his precocious youth. A child who learned to read Latin at the age of three, and Greek at four, and published his first book at eleven (*Primitiae, or Essays and Poems on Various Subjects*), with an essay on "The Uncertainty of Life," written at the age of seven, was certainly a stranger to his fellows and suffered from the handicaps of an unnatural and forced development.

The debt that the Anglican Church owes to Thirwall can never be overestimated. The penetrating clarity of his mind, the wise and judicious character of his judgments and the untiring zeal with which he tried to establish truth and justice, were rare qualities in an age marked by such excesses as resulted from the Oxford Movement and the Colenso Case. Almost always Thirwall stood for the broad and liberal point of view, and is rightly regarded as one of the founders and foremost leaders of the Broad Church Movement. Yet he was never partisan. "Broad Church," he believed, meant comprehension, not exclusion, and was not to be set in opposition to "High Church" and

"Low Church." Hence he wrote in reply to those who used the term by way of reproach,

> "There is an opposition which all educated men more or less clearly understand between High Church and Low Church, but there is none between Broad Church and either. The proper antithesis to Broad is not High or Low, but Narrow. It would be monstrous presumption, and utterly inconsistent with Broad Church principles according to my view, for any school or party to pretend to the monopoly of this title, as if there were no Broad Churchmen to be found outside of its own little circle. I hope and believe that there are numbers who have a rightful claim to it, among those who only profess to belong to one or other of the two great sections of the Church." (p. 180).

We can here do no more than mention some of the major contributions of Thirwall to his age, leaving the reader to peruse the biography for greater detail. Thirwall was the first scholar to acquaint English readers with German thought, translating Schleirmacher's *Lucas*. He chose, significantly, the "least romantic of all his productions" and one which most clearly exemplified "scientific theology." The preface to his translation was far too advanced for the obscurantist theologians of his day. The imputations of heresy with which he was charged from every side followed his whole career, and his orthodoxy was suspected even to his dying day.

The next important controversy, in which he was involved, concerned the admission of Dissenters to Cambridge University. His vigorous championing of their cause lost him his tutorship at Trinity, and plunged him into the world of parish life in a Yorkshire village. During these years he was far from idle. He produced five volumes of his *History of Greece*, the first significant attempt to write classical history with a grasp of the German historical method, an appreciation of which he had already gained from his acquaintance with Niebuhr. His translation of the latter's *History of Rome* had already had an enormous influence upon his Cambridge students, and above all upon the "Apostles" club, of which he was an honorary member. This society numbered among its adherents such distinguished youth as Sterling, Maurice, Kemble, the Tennysons, and Fitzjames Stephens, all of whom were to play an important part in the Broad Church Movement.

Although Thirwall's *History of Greece* became superseded by the more colorful and vivid work of Grote, in scientific impartiality and

shrewd judgment it was far superior. Grote's point of view—that of the politician and man of business—enlivened his history but detracted from its exactness. Thirwall's was characterised by a careful, studious and sometimes dull, attempt to get at the precise truth. Yet he ranks highly with the historians of the past. Bryce, for instance, placed him with Gibbon and Ranke, relegating Grote to a second class with Macaulay and Green.

It may not be out of place here to remark upon Thirwall's unselfish character. When the work of Grote appeared he sincerely welcomed it with generous praise (*Letters*, p. 194), and it is an interesting reflection upon him that, while Grote so soon eclipsed his fame as the historian of Greece, they remained lifelong friends till Grote's death in 1871.

Thirwall's scientific liberalism is evident in practically all his theological writing. It is especially marked in his careful and shrewd appraisal of the Oxford Movement in his *Charges* of 1842 (p. 203) and 1848 (p. 206). His work as chairman of the Old Testament Revision Company was characterised by well-informed and scrupulous good judgment.

The sphere of his activity was not limited purely to theology. The House of Lords found in him an ecclesiastical statesman of broad vision and wise understanding. He upheld the enfranchisement of the Jews and was the only bishop with enough foresight to vote in favour of the repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846 (p. 142) and the disestablishment of the Irish Church. Such courage and zeal for justice were rare on the episcopal bench of his generation. His untiring efforts for popular education, and such work in the diocese of St. David's as his restoration of the cathedral and his preaching to the people in their own Welsh tongue, show that he was concerned with practical tasks as well as with theoretical scholarship.

It is true that he was not a man of passionate religious convictions nor of emotional nature. His religion was perhaps most clearly distinguished by its firm ethical basis and by its wide and liberal sympathy. He believed in moderation and scholarship and fought for freedom of thought within the broad limits of the Church and was concerned to establish justice in the State. His significant contribution to the life and thought of the English Church is ably summarised by his biographer when he writes,

"The name of Thirwall and the Broad Church is dim today. As long, nevertheless, as patient and quite research, tending to balanced judgment, is esteemed; as long as enlightened scholarship among the clergy is appreciated; as long as freedom of speculation in religion is approved—so long will the effect of the Broad Church Movement be gratefully remembered and the name of Bishop Thirwall honoured." (p. 194)

CYRIL C. RICHARDSON

Union Theological Seminary

The Early Days of Christian Socialism in America. By JAMES DOMBROWSKI. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. ix + 208 pp. $3.25.

Dr. Dombrowski's book is a welcome addition to the small number of available historical essays on the social movement in American Christianity. It presents a series of sketches of men and movements hitherto frequently neglected by writers on the subject. Stephen Colwell, W. D. P. Bliss, Henry D. Lloyd, ephemeral journals and organizations, as well as the better known figures, Richard T. Ely, Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and George D. Herron, and the more frequently described societies and movements, are given their due place in the development of the "social gospel." The chapter on the Christian Commonwealth Colony is especially noteworthy. All of this is valuable material for the historian and the sociologist as well as for leaders of social and religious movements, who cannot but draw profit from such descriptions and analyses of the failures and successes of 19th century advocates of a socialized faith.

If the strength of the book lies in the descriptive method which is pursued for the most part, its weakness lies in its efforts at interpretation. The author's standpoint seems to be that of a "Marxist Christian" or "Christian Marxist," and his selection of materials seems to have been guided by the qualified Marxian position. But he fails to make clear just what his criteria are, and what he means by Christian Socialism. If the title be taken in a narrow sense, there is both too much and too little in this volume: too much, since it deals with some reformers and reform movements who had little relation to socialism; too little, since it leaves out of account that long series of socialistic experiments which came to their climax in the pre-Civil War period and of which the Christian Commonwealth Colony was only

a belated example. If on the other hand the book is intended to deal —as its first chapter rather than its title indicates—with the "social emphasis in American Christianity," its scope is far too restricted, since it virtually omits discussion of the leading exponents of that emphasis, that is of Washington Gladden, Samuel Harris, Stanton Coit, Josiah Strong, Vida Scudder, Charles R. Henderson and others whose connection with the organized Christian community was far closer than that of most of the men mentioned. The difficulty might be put in this way: if it was Christian Socialism which the author wanted to describe then the term "Early Days" is unfortunate; but if he wished to account for the social movement of the late 19th century then the term "Christian Socialism" is badly chosen.

The confusion evident here is one which besets many interpretations of the "social gospel," and is probably due to the intellectualistic fallacy. Such interpretations assume that a movement, such as this one, has its origin in a certain philosophy. So Dr. Dombrowski, in the least successful chapter of the volume, attempts to describe the "Philosophy of Social Christianity" with the net result, for the reader, of demonstrating that social Christianity had no philosophy, but only certain poorly correlated or uncorrelated ideas derived from the most divergent sources. Would it not be better to say that the vague and constantly disintegrating movement called social Christianity had its source not in an idea but in a problem? The problem was the evident maladjustment of society in the post-Civil War period. It was made evident by the increase of poverty in the cities, the recurrent economic crises, the explicit emergence of the class-struggle. In the face of this situation Christians divided into two groups—the satisfied and the dissatisfied. The former were not necessarily individualistic nor the latter collectivistic in their fundamental philosophy; neither can we call the one group "other-wordly," the second "this-worldly," or "pessimistic" and "optimistic." So far as philosophy was concerned there were individualists and collectivists, this-worldly and other-worldly men on both sides. The important question was whether the "philosophy" should be used for the defense or for the criticism of the existing order and disorder. Among the critics were men with very diverse antecedents and philosophies; more had derived their ideas from Edwards and Finney than from the Enlightenment, or from Owen and Marx, more from the Bible than from "The Social Con-

tract" or "Das Kapital." What they had in common was the recognition that the common life was with its customs and institutions, subject to criticism and in need of change. This, rather than a common philosophy, united them. Moreover, just as the intellectual sources were various so the consequences have been various. It is by no means evident that Christian Socialism of a Marxist sort is the characteristic outcome of the movement. As in Europe so in America, Christian Nationalism (*cf.* Bellamy and Josiah Strong) has been and may be as characteristic a product. It is evidently too early to assess the social movement in Christianity as though its historical significance had become apparent, unless one accepts the Marxian dogmas, or other equally certain criteria for analyzing the meaning of all possible social experience. If Dr. Dombrowski accepts the Marxian dogma there is no ground for quarrelling though one may dissent; but in that case he should have made quite clear from what point of view he is selecting and interpreting his materials.

H. R. Niebuhr

Yale Divinity School

God in Action: Theological Addresses. By Karl Barth. English translation by E. G. Homrighausen and Karl J. Ernst. Introduction by Josias Friedli. New York: Round Table Press, 1936. xii + 143 pp. $1.75.

God in Action by Karl Barth is a translation and bears certain earmarks characteristic of translations: absence or distortion of the author's personality as it lives in his words, loss of delicate shades of meaning, and the presence of the translators' interpretations and misinterpretations. Of the last there are several instances, the most glaring perhaps being the one found on page 83. Here we read: "The world gladly grants that God *is* free, the Church will not grant that God *remains* free!" This important sentence should read: "The world will not grant that God *is* free, and the church will not grant that God *remains* free." Only the second translation is warranted by the original[1] and is consistent with the rest of Barth's thought.

But aside from the defects mentioned, the book has the merit of presenting under an appropriate title, if it be correctly understood, five

[1] Karl Barth, "Der Dienst am Wort Gottes." *Theol. Existenz heute,* Heft 13, p. 16.

lectures that give much of Barth's essential teaching, and an interesting and illuminating discussion between Barth and foreign students that followed the delivery of one of them. The first three lectures treat of revelation, the church, and theology respectively. They were originally prepared as an introduction to Barth's theology for the French. The last two treat of the ministry of the Word of God, and of the Christian as a witness, and form a suitable supplement to the idea of revelation presented in the first three. The relation between the last two, however, would doubtless be clearer if read in the order in which they were originally delivered rather than in the order in which they appear in this translation.

The key to the right understanding of these lectures, given explicitly neither in them nor in the introduction by Josias Friedli, is that Barth understands himself as proceeding in his thinking, not from himself or any human experience, religious or other, but from a simple occurrence of divine revelation to him personally, an occurrence that is its own certainty and validation, and that is not the outgrowth or effect of any psychological state. In this occurrence specific portions of the Bible from time to time temporarily become God's Word for Barth. Furthermore, the direct implication of this occurrence as well as the fundamental assumption of the content of revelation is an absolute discontinuity between God, on the one hand, and man and the world, on the other hand, a discontinuity that can be bridged by God alone and is actually bridged by him in this very occurrence.

In the light of this point of departure, which Barth affirms was essentially also the point of departure of the Reformers, everything that is correctly translated in these lectures becomes clear, or is recognized as a deviation from the main line of Barth's thought. All Barth's characterizations in them of revelation, faith, the church, theology, God, sin, reconciliation, redemption, preaching, and witnessing, as well as his constant appeal to the Bible agree with this conception of revelation, and are wholly dependent for their validity on the actuality of the alleged occurrence of such revelation. They become fully intelligible only when it is understood that they are intended as an analysis of the occurrence of revelation and a development of its content, rather than as a rationalization or confirmation of either.

To give a critical estimate of these lectures, therefore, we can do no better than to give a critical estimate of this point of departure.

Barth, as stated above, on the basis of an alleged revelation assumes and affirms an absolute discontinuity between God and man, a discontinuity which God alone can and does bridge. It seems, however, pertinent to ask whether the alleged discontinuity is not negated the moment it is bridged, no matter by whom the bridging is done. Barth, especially in his *Prolegomena zur kirchlichen Dogmatik*,[2] when treating of the knowability of the Word of God and of faith, the subjective side of revelation, tries to avoid this conclusion, but a critical reading of his attempt leaves the reader unsatisfied. With all his elaborate dialectics he does not get around this simple criticism, which is positively devastating for what is distinctive in his theology. He does not succeed in showing how revelation, which implies an absolute discontinuity between God and man, can occur without contradicting its own implication. Revelation and absolute discontinuity are incompatible concepts. Take the first seriously and the second is negated, take the second seriously and the first is negated; for the first implies at least some degree of natural or original continuity between God and man.

A recognition of the validity of this criticism alone would rule Barth's theology, epitomized in these lectures, out of court. But besides this there are also other criticisms that should be advanced.

Everything for Barth depends on the actuality of the occurrence of revelation. If this actuality, therefore, is seriously questioned, Barth's whole theology is seriously questioned. And, without doubting Barth's sincerity, this is the thing that we, in view of simple facts, must do. When we notice that his conception of faith is the result of a development, that counterparts of many features of his theology are to be found in the thought of others whose influence on him is indisputable, that he himself seems convinced of the general rationality or possibility of his thought, and that his idea of revelation is, as a matter of fact, an apparent solution of the problem of reason and faith with which he once wrestled, but which he never satisfactorily solved, as Herrmann, his teacher, did, in an admittedly human or philosophical way—when we notice all that, we question the actuality of the occurrence of revelation that Barth affirms. In other

[2] Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München, 1932.

words, we question the alleged character of Barth's faith, and surmise that he is the victim of a subtle self-deception and that, after all, his theology partakes more of the nature of a theological system or religious philosophy than he will admit.

There are certain more or less incidental statements Barth has from time to time made that confirm this questioning and this surmise. Noteworthy in the present volume are his autobiographical statement on pages 133-135, which suggests some psychological preparation for his new insight into the Bible and his new experience and conception of faith, and the statement of his belief in the importance of being onesided (pages 138 f.), which he bases at least in part on human experience. Such statements alone would lead one to surmise that Barth's faith is something more than the wholly and directly God-given experience that Barth affirms it to be.

As for Barth everything depends on the actuality of the occurrence of revelation, so everything he teaches also depends on the correctness of his interpretation of the Bible, for it is this that is said repeatedly to become God's Word in the occurrence of revelation. Consequently, if Barth's interpretation of the Bible can be successfully challenged, the genuineness of his alleged revelation is seriously called in question.

The possibility of such a challenge seems certain. Barth's whole interpretation of the Bible, as reflected only to a small degree in the lectures under discussion, proceeds on the supposition that the Bible throughout assumes an absolute discontinuity between God and man. This supposition, admittedly, seems to be favored by some portions of the Bible, but apparently works havoc with others, notably with its ethical portions and those which to all appearances teach a general revelation. The interpretations given to these portions are not the more obvious and the simpler, but the less obvious and the more biased. Indeed, they often seem unnatural and forced.

The foregoing criticisms all directly impugn Barth's point of departure, and thereby the theology presented in the lectures under review. Barth, it seems, is deceiving himself with respect to the nature of his faith and is really trying to uphold an impossible, because self-contradictory, idea of revelation.

This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that it is not clear from Barth's statements what the exact content of revelation and the exact relation of the Creator to his creation are. In connection with these

matters, he struggles to maintain a God unknown and yet known, a man wholly negated with respect to his self-assertion and self-realization and yet essentially affirmed, a creation absolutely discontinuous with its Creator and yet dependent on him at one and the same time, with the result that his statements appear to be self-contradictory and his conceptions of God, the new man, and creation remain obscure. In other words, Barth's maintenance of an absolute discontinuity between God and man, while he affirms the occurrence of a revelation, not only implies a self-contradiction but also prevents him from giving a clear and consistent content to revelation; and his maintenance of a discontinuity between the Creator and his creation, while he affirms a definite relationship between them, prevents him from stating that relationship unequivocally.

PETER H. MONSMA

New York

Reason and Emotion. By JOHN MACMURRAY. New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1936. 278 pp. $2.00.

The Structure of Religious Experience. By JOHN MACMURRAY. D. H. Terry Lectures for 1935-1936. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936. xi + 77 pp. $1.50.

In the first book, Professor Macmurray repudiates the common opinion that reason consists merely in "thinking, planning, scheming, and calculating" (p. 15). He defines it as "the capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is not ourselves" (p. 19). Therefore, reason is not just thinking, nor is emotion just feeling. There is such a thing as "rational emotion," which is aroused with the proper comprehension of the nature of any given object of experience. To be rational is to be moved and to act with proper regard for "what is not ourselves."

Science has no exclusive claim to rationality. "Through science we relate ourselves *really*, as material bodies, to the material world." Art is the activity whereby we "relate ourselves organically to organic nature; and the pressure toward an objective, rational relationship with this world of life gives rise to art in all its forms" (p. 203). Morality "demands that we should act 'in the light of eternity,' that is in terms of things as they really are and of people as they really are, and not in terms of our subjective inclinations and private sympa-

thies" (p. 23). Finally, religion "is reason in human nature creating the community of persons—recognizing and achieving the unity of all personal life. It is the force which creates friendship, society, community, co-operation in living. That is why I am wont to say that friendship is the fundamental religious fact in human life" (p. 62-63). Where there is the recognition of the freedom and the equality of men as persons, there is religion. Religion is communion between persons; what others have called "reverence for personality." It is objective, rational relatedness between persons.

Therefore, Professor Macmurray is impressed with the "infantile and immature" character of the historical religions (p. 195). Christianity is "infected with subjectivity and incapable of expressing its true nature" (pp. 259-260). Its dualism, idealism, and otherworldliness are the chief marks of its infantility and impurity. It is unaware that the purpose of religion is to promote fellowship in *this* world; that religious symbols are for communion in this world; that religious ideas are for the purpose of promoting rational relations among people in the existing society. Overcome by the difficulty of the task confronting it, Christianity has set aside its true mission, and diverted men's attention to *another* imaginary world. "And I repeat—the only positive Christian thing in the world as yet is modern science. A Christian philosophy, a Christian art, and then a Christian religion still await creation" (p. 193).

In the second book, Professor Macmurray gives an analysis of presumably nonexistent religion. He interprets the common phraseology of religion in conformity with his definition of it. "Whatever brings two persons into contradiction or opposition with one another is sin. It is, therefore, that which requires forgiveness if its consequences—the alienation which it produces—are to be abolished and reconciliation achieved. . . . What is required is repentance, that the state of consciousness should be radically altered. But how can a state of consciousness alter itself in opposition to its own nature? That is the source of the dilemma which expresses itself in the religious paradox that a man is helpless to save himself from sin, and yet his salvation can only come about through his own free action" (pp. 42-43). In fact, the old paradox of grace and free will, and others related to it, seem to arise from men's *intention* to "achieve community" and their negating of "it as fact." Thus religion is essentially the intention

to establish human brotherhood which involves the recognition of its present absence. And the paradox of religion is the ordinary paradox that we intend what we have not achieved!

For all the apparent profundity and almost inpenetrable wisdom of Professor Macmurray's description of religion, this reviewer is able to gather from it only certain ideas which are commonplaces in contemporary religious thinking, especially among "religious humanists" and "radical Christians." In effect, Professor Macmurray seems to say that religion ought to promote friendship and harmonious intercourse between persons; that men ought to have proper regard for the good of others; that they ought to recognize the mutuality which differentiates personal relationships from the organic and the material; that they ought to establish "community" and cease to strive with each other to their mutual destruction. These are the hackneyed if always relevant ideals of "love" and "brotherhood" which are cherished by most of the enlightened Christians of our day. And alas, for some mysterious reason which Professor Macmurray does not seem to care to explain, their effectiveness in social relations seems to remain negligible.

The "infantile" religions of the past were often more realistic than Professor Macmurray, for they recognized the tremendous difficulty of establishing "community." Indeed they have been concerned with human relations. But, I think in their superior insight into the problem of morality, they have been also, if not primarily, concerned with man's relationship to God, "the Determiner of Destiny." Men felt insufficient to triumph over "sin and death." Hence they cried unto their God and prayed for deliverance. They worshipped God together or in partial isolation. But they were interested in what God would do to them, rather than in achieving community. Morality was not a matter of rationality, but of conformity to the will of God who rewarded them "to their face." Evidently Professor Macmurray thinks such religion was infantile. In this he may be wrong. It may be that the task of achieving rationality in human relations is different from that of achieving it in "science." It may be that we do not become objective toward persons without that terrible subjectivity in which we face our God and recognize our sin before *Him*. The problem of objectivity and subjectivity in human relations is one which Professor

Macmurray has not begun to consider. If he had, he would have been able to notice that the dualism and otherworldliness of historical Christianity were closely related to that tragic sense of life which has been a source of that fellowship he advocates.

The above are matters of judgment. I only present my views as alternatives to those of Professor Macmurray. But I confess to the "rational emotion" of surprise to find him using the Bible with the carelessness of a revivalist. "One has only to read the Christian Gospels to realize that it was for the realistic, empirical naturalism of his attitude that Jesus was hounded to death by the traditionalists of his day (*Structure*, p. ix)." "Judge not, that ye be not judged," is supposed to mean, "While I am valuing them (others), they are valuing me" (*ibid.* p. 20). On the other hand, perhaps, "judged" means judged by God. "Which of you, by taking thought, can add a cubit to his stature," is made to mean, "In religion intellectual expression does not precede but follows the actual experience of practical activity" (*ibid.* p. 58). It appears that the "least of the scientific practitioners was greater than the greatest of the speculative intellects" as "the least in the kingdom of heaven" was to be greater than John the Baptist (*Reason*, p. 247). One more citation will illustrate Professor Macmurray's treatment of history. "The one creative achievement of the Reformation was science and the scientific spirit. Science is thus the legitimate child of a great religious movement, and its genealogy goes back to Jesus. In its true sense, science is the one proper, positive expression of Christianity that the world has yet seen. The rest of modern culture—its art, morality, and religion—is simply the disrupted remnants of the pseudo-Christianity of the medieval world" (*ibid.* p. 172). I think what one is supposed to do upon reading a paragraph like this is to wonder whether Professor Macmurray has not received an illumination which is not available through the ordinary study of historical facts.

Those who find it hard to be scientific, rational, Christian, and communistic, all at once, will derive much satisfaction from Professor Macmurray's opinions. Yet, I think that his simple religion of friendship or communion has been derived without regard for the social and political realities of the modern world, in which communists must coerce, Christians must believe in God, and rational men must remain

critical of all simple solutions of the problem of establishing "community."

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

Wellesley College

What Religion Is and Does. By HORACE T. HOUF. New York: Harpers, 1935. viii + 374 pp. $3.00.

The present volume is the fruit of Professor Houf's course in religion at Ohio University. It is definitely (and admittedly) of the text-book type, and has the defects as well as the virtues of a book of this sort. That is to say, it covers a large territory, with references to many authorities (mostly modern), but it is of necessity superficial and does not present a consistently developed position. Much that is said is valuable, and needs saying; much seems rather irrelevant, and some of it useless listing and statistical tables of membership in various denominations, etc.

Mr. Houf is convinced that "several great influences have been changing modern life, and are significant for religion." Among these he cites the machine age, newer scientific knowledge, and Biblical criticism. Against this background, he seeks to present a case for religion which is philosophically sound, scientifically acceptable, and critically accurate. He succeeds in his effort to a very large degree, and we are sure that no student could have attended his lectures or read the book without feeling that religion, and more particularly Christianity, is by no means to be discarded without a hearing.

After a survey of definitions of religion, and a sketch of "what religion does" (assures man of superhuman help, aids him in life's crises, offers an explanation of evil, integrates personality, "motivates" individual and group life, supports sound morals, offers a way of salvation), the volume discusses the industrial revolution, the scientific world of today, and the present philosophical outlook. A realistic approach is taken to the doctrine of God (following Macintosh and Wieman), and the somewhat bare product of this approach is supplemented by the testimony of religious experience. The result is that God is conceived as a divine, eternal Reality, who enters into personal relations with men, is approachable through prayer, and is revealed in the world.

After a discussion of immortality, Mr. Houf proceeds to a survey of the Christian religion. Here he gives us a quite good summary of the modern position on the Bible, with the results of Biblical criticism (not the latest results, for he seems unaware of form-criticism, although no important change in his treatment is required if this new method be admitted), and a sketch of the life of Jesus in the light of that study. A somewhat inadequate treatment of Christianity as a religious movement follows. There are later chapters on the Church (understating its importance, if the concept of "The Body of Christ" be allowed), social morality and religion, and "the ethics of belief." In the last chapter, a section on Christian certainty is worth reading: we cannot claim absolute proof for Christian beliefs, but we may claim a practical certainty based on converging probabilities tested in experience, after they have been found intellectually respectable and socially coherent.

The prevailing tone of the book is American liberal Protestantism, with a strongly ethical flavor. The reviewer would be dishonest if he did not say that he feels that this type of religion cannot stand up under direct criticism. The historical, institutional, sacramental stress is required, as our modern theologians (such as Van Dusen, Bennett and Horton) see clearly. Nevertheless, it is good to have books like this one, honest, sincere and fearless in facing new truth. We hope it is widely used.

W. Norman Pittenger

General Theological Seminary

A Catholic Looks at His World: An Approach to Christian Sociology. By Bernard Iddings Bell. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1936. 130 pp. $1.25.

This is an extremely logical and penetrating book written by one of the outstanding thinkers of the present day in the Episcopal Church. The author is not merely a simple priest, but he is a man who has had wide experience among all classes of society and in many fields of activity. He is also one of the most fearless and logical indicters of present-day civilization with its claims to a Christian character. For that reason large sections of the book can be read with the greatest interest, and his comments on the democratic and totalitarian states

cannot be neglected. In fact we have here a volume which in simple and clear language exposes the position of the Church and the evils of the present social order.

Unfortunately the positive sides of the book are not as clear as the negative views of present day social organization. This is perhaps inevitable when we realize the author's point of view in Chapter One, The Catholic Point of View. This chapter is perhaps the clearest and the most definite part of the whole work, although it will not have the appeal of some other sections. Here the author clearly and decisively sets forth the other-worldly character of Christianity, and of Catholicism, and he shows very clearly that no secularist solution of the world problem is possible that will satisfy the Christian.

As a result of this the Christian must seek some other solution of the problem, a religious, other-worldly solution, and hence Catholic sociology must be different from beginning to ending, for we cannot assume that there is a definite movement for good from generation to generation outside of the reformation of each individual and each generation of society. What does this imply?

It implies first a definite relationship between the Church, the State, and the Community. Yet we may ask if there is a Community outside of the Church and the State (especially if we understand by Church not merely the Christian Church, but that attitude or organization which appeals to those religious and self-sacrificing motives which are summed up for the Christian in the word Church. The author regards the State as merely the police power of the Community (p. 46). What is to be regarded as the proper use of the police power? Is it merely the power to protect the people "from lawless rogues within, and from enemies without"? Can we associate it with the protection of the people from unhealthly living conditions, and from obscene movies and theatrical productions? Or are these to be left free and untouched and to be regarded as coming under the scope of the Church?

But if the Church is to be merely a "Remnant" (p. 100 ff), it cannot seek to enforce its will either on the Community or the State. It must persuade by self-sacrifice, and its influence on the Community may be great or small. Yet is the Community to act outside of Church or State and if so, will it not thereby become essentially either Church or State? It may well be asked if Canon Bell has not invoked the idea of the Community as a means of avoiding a clash between Church

and State, and if the other thinkers whom he has followed do not do the same thing.

Again in regard to the economic problem. He believes there is today "one single economic problem—the problem of how to get into the hands of the people who labor enough pay to enable them to buy the things which they have made" (p. 80). This is a clear statement, but is it not too simple? Are we sure that all the things made are for the good of humanity? One is almost tempted to confront Canon Bell with Tolstoy's theories of agrarianism as the only true life, and his detestation of the city and all that it implies. We might also stress the diminishing importance of urban life in the period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the Middle Ages which Canon Bell so admires. Perhaps our trouble here is that we have merely misstated the problem or placed the emphasis in the wrong place, and if so, this part of his sociology will also fall to the ground.

The same comments may be made upon his views of the Church. Are the six causes that he mentions really responsible for the collapse of the influence of Christianity or are the real causes to be found elsewhere? Or is it possible that we are reading into the past centuries a glory which was not there?

We cannot answer these questions at the present time, but we must wonder what the degradation of personality really means. This is fundamental in much of the school that Canon Bell represents, but what and why is it? There have never been such opportunities for man to develop culturally and spiritually as today. Despite the World War, there has been far less fear in the past century that a man will be suddenly called to protect his home, his family, and his life, than at any time since the fall of the Roman Empire. There has been more education, more literacy, more comfort, than at any time in the world's history. And yet man is more degraded than ever. Is the fear of losing one's job today any more common than the fear of a local famine or a bad harvest centuries ago? One means relief; the other meant a lingering death. And yet man is more degraded than ever. To put it this way almost means a resort to Tolstoyanism, or the abolition of factories, machines, and corporations, and yet that does not seem to be the answer, if his statement of the economic problem is to be accepted.

We hear much of the martyrs in the Roman Empire and there is an appeal for Christians today to follow their example. But what act

of the United States of America today is similar to refusing to burn incense before the altar of the Emperor, a religious apostasy? What is the Christian to do? How is he to be martyred? None of the methods indicated by the author seem important enough to merit, or even to bring about, martyrdom, and he calmly ignores the one example in the world today, the Orthodox Christians under the Soviet rule, and we might add the Christians in Mexico. Yet perhaps they are not being martyred for advanced sociological opinions, but because they are Bourbons (p. 78).

There is no doubt a real crisis in the religious and secular world today but we can be sure of one thing, that so far no one has yet cammanded public attention for any solution of the problem that is not going to make bad matters worse. The valuable part of Canon Bell's book is his strong indictment of present conditions in economics, in the State, and in the Church. Yet outside of the Golden Rule, he has given us nothing constructive or distinctly applicable. It required centuries to form a new world after the collapse of the Roman Empire, and it may well be asked if the culture of the Middle Ages was really built on Old Rome in the right way. Perhaps a little less prejudiced admiration for the Western Middle Ages will give us a solution, or the destruction of our society may be all for the best. The world does need more of the spirit of Christ, but so far we do not see how to interpret what there is to our civilization. Perhaps that is our task now, or perhaps we must withdraw from the world completely like the Christians in the pagan Empire. Yet in any case the question of discipline and of organization will surely arise, and we can be very sure that Canon Bell will be able to give a vigorous and forceful condemnation of whatever system may be in vogue at any given moment.

Clarence A. Manning

Columbia University

Metapsychologie: Ein systematischer Beitrag zur Glaubens-und Religionsgeschichte der Menschheit. By Herman Mandel. *Abhandlungen und Monographien zur Philosophie des Wirklichen:* Nr. 6. Leipzig: Barth, 1935. xi + 189 pp. RM 9.

Continuing in the tradition of current German anthropology, which has become rather a Nordic "anthr*apology*," Mandel's book serves

above all as an apology for a superior German mysticism which is implicit in a *Wirklichkeitsreligion*. This "reality-religion" concerns itself with "the experience of the soul contemplating the unfathomed depths of the world and life, of nature and history, of fate and purpose and, not least, itself, as a part and an expression of eternal existence." Reflecting, as it does, the racial bio-psyche, "reality-religion is essentially Aryan religion." Its interest is in a unified total view of the universe as opposed to the Semitic religion (Christianity) "which is concerned with the creation of certainty for man." Since *Wirklichkeitsreligion* believes that "the essence of religion lies not in supernormal experiencing *per se*, but in the special sensitivity for the metaphysical depth of the natural life-reality" which, according to Mandel, characterizes the German psyche, he proposes to investigate the "reality-content and range of intra-psychic potentialities" and thus build up a systematic metapsychology.

Stated in formal terms, metapsychology is concerned "with the structure and function of the supernormal psychic life." By "supernormal" the author does not mean supernatural. Neither does he restrict the word to such phenomena as telepathy, clairvoyance and mediumism. Rather, he uses it to refer to every conceivable type of non-normal psychic state, whether it be sleep or paranoia, auto-suggestion or mediumism. Religion, for him, is essentially anchored in supernormal experience, although "normal" psychological factors also condition belief. He includes among these: sublimation of sexual impulses, the desire for continuous life, the search for certainty, and the desire to submit to something higher and unconditioned. The last, he states, is most characteristic of German mysticism and, one might add parenthetically, of contemporary Nazi ideology. The search for certainty, on the other hand, characterizes the Semitic type of religion which has reached its flowering in Christianity. "Primitive" religion, of course, in its concern with "magic" can never hope to "achieve the heights of Indo-Germanic religion."

The author's "systematic typology and genetic psychology of supernormal states" is a very ambitious one, covering as it does practically every non-normal phenomenon conceivable. So far as typology is concerned it seems adequate, though it most certainly is not novel. Supernormal psychic states are placed into three very familiar categories: those with (a) a physiological aetiology, for example, sleep, fever,

exhaustion; (b) a psycho-physiological aetiology, as the psychoses and psycho-neuroses; and, (c) a psychically conditioned causal background, for example, the phenomena associated with suggestion and repression. As far as a genetic psychology of these phenomena is concerned, however, the author contributes practically nothing. When he writes of "the accomplishments of the supernormal psychic states" all he does really is to continue his previous systematization. The feeling of "mystic presence," for example, is called an intra-psychic accomplishment, automatic writing a psycho-physiological accomplishment, telepathy and mediumistic phenomena physical accomplishments. Naturally, there is no efficacy in such pigeon-holing. The phenomena are simply labelled, no light is thrown on their genetic background.

The author proceeds then to "interpret" those supernormal states which have a reference to mysticism. The essence of mysticism is, for him, the desire to be "one with God," whether this oneness be conceived of as personal or impersonal. "All peoples and cultures possess this fundamental drive for union with God." "It is, however, a great mistake that when Christian theology speaks of 'mysticism' it does not take into account super-racial and super-cultural factors—thus doing away, naturally, with the uniqueness of German mysticism." Of the different "types" of mysticism, reality-mysticism is the noblest. Unlike the "other-worldly" mysticism of the Christian tradition, it does not try to escape beyond reality to find God, but discovers him in all of surrounding nature. "Reality-mysticism is classically portrayed in German mysticism, in fact it is implicit in the Nordic soul."

On the whole one might characterize the book as an inadequate attempt to create a religious theory consonant with the demands of the prevalent Nazi ideology. The author promises the early publication of a companion volume, "Aryan Religion," which will elaborate his theses further.

HENRY J. WEGROCKI

Minneapolis, Minn.

Die Religion und die Gemeinshaftsmächte: Gegenwartsfragen der Religionssoziologie. By ALFRED A. KRAUSKOPF. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1935. 50 pp. RM 1.80.

A useful survey of recent German sociology applied to religion. After a criticism of Max Weber's work on the ground that he failed

to conceive of religion itself socially, and merely examined the economic accompaniments of religion, the author describes summarily the various types of sociological method that have been applied directly to religion since Weber. Under the heading "Naturalistic-collectivistic theories" he discusses Frobenius, Spengler and Rosenberg; under "*Geisteswissenschaftliche*" theories, Alfred Adler, Johannes Neumann, Fritz Künkel, Schjelderup-Oslo, C. G. Jung, Hermann Schwarz, Ernst Lohmeyer, Karl Dunkmann and J. Wach. The essay ends with an outline of the practical religious problems for sociology, especially education, leisure, preaching and religious experience.

From the discussion of Dunkmann's sociology I cite the following paragraphs* (pp. 31-35):

THE SYSTEMATICS OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

The first systematized outlines of a sociology of religion are those of Wach and Dunkmann, and they are of recent date. In these first attempts at formulating a system this youngest branch of the science of religion has been given its fundamental direction, and it in turn has assigned to the science of religion new and urgent tasks. To be sociologically conditioned is of the very nature of religion. From this thesis and its implications as to both method and content the whole religio-scientific and theological problem of our day must be attacked. Only from a communal sociological point of view will it be possible to overcome the individualistic concept of religion which is rendering theological trends sterile. All these trends, even though mutually contradictory and exclusive, can be taken up and critically treated as one. In their basic concept of religion neither dialectic nor liberal, neither positive nor orthodox theology considers it essential to hold that religion is sociologically conditioned.

Hence they of themselves could not effect a church and a communion. By the religio-methodological principle alone it is not possible to discover theoretically that religion is sociologically conditioned. This fact can be found only in the communion. Hence this thesis in theology was seldom, and then only temporarily, maintained during the Reformation, which severed church and communion. As we reflect upon the deep rupture in the religious communion of our day we are inwardly urged to subject the various controlling individualistic concepts of religion to a revision, proceeding from the axiom that religion is sociologically conditioned.

In the more recent sociology of religion definite attempts to overcome present individualistic concepts of religion on the basis of a normatively understood sociology of religion are to be found only in Dunkmann. Ac-

* Translated by F. W. Schneider with permission of the publisher.

cording to him the present concept of the nature of religion is basically controlled by Augustine. Augustine's fundamental tenet "*mihi adhaerere deo bonum est*" injects itself into the fundamental religious concepts of "medieval and post-medieval mysticism," as well as into "the ecclesiastical orthodoxy of both catholicism and protestantism." The Augustinian formula also entered as a presupposition into Lutheranism, Calvinism, Pietism, the rational philosophy of religion of the Enlightenment, and liberalism. This formula involves "social isolation" and only indirectly arrives at the establishment of communal relations, since souls meet as "communions" and as empirical "societies" only in communion with God. There is no immanent need for the formation of a religious society. Thus the concept of a religious communion seems always to be of the nature of a deduction."

According to Dunkmann Augustine's individualistic concept of religion was "for the first time and definitely pushed *ad absurdum*" by the dialectic theology. He does not directly credit the dialecticians with this achievement, since they arrived at their inner denial of the Augustinian formula unconsciously, while adhering to it formally.

In Dunkmann I seem to find the first critical understanding of dialectical theology that really marks a victory over dialectics. One of the principal needs of theology today is a sociological-theological elaboration of his all too generalized, and in part also, abstract outline. In the new separation of church and nation the theological and ecclesiastical untenability of the position of dialectic theology became clear, for its overemphasis on the individualistic interpretation of religion was the result of its meditation on God and on the concept of God's absolute relationship to man (rather than man's relationship to God); at the same time it completely overlooked the "sociological" element in religion. As we increasingly find a communal ground even for science and theology, dialectics appears more and more to us to be a system of thought estranged from communion and life. Barth's orthodox accent on the "church" is also essentially "reasoned" ("*gedachte*") communion. It is essential to note that the victory over Barth was not gained through logic and dialectic, but through the irruption of communal forces in the upheaval of recent times, and also that this victory is wholly intelligible only on the basis of theological-sociological thinking. In Barth's dialectical attempt there is no trace of communal sociological thinking. His real dialectic, which lies in the infinite difference and contrast of God and man, is to be presented through his formal dialectic in the logical paradox. That is Barth's fundamental intention. In the main it is grouped, as is most of contemporary theology, about the problem "reason and revelation." Today, however, the problem "revelation and communion" must be in the foreground of theological effort and ecclesiastical concern. The ground for this fundamental shift is our present upheaval. Modern theology, which for the most part is dialectically oriented, is under the influence of the post-war mind. It was not equal to the attacks made upon the very heart of religion, and withdrew from the discussion by narrowly circumscribing itself; i.e.,

by theoretical self-protection. To this day theological discussion of questions such as the national ethos, the philosophy of life, or the race problem appears lamentable. A dialectic that is estranged from life still stakes off its domain in the face of the frontal attack and avoids all coming out into the open field of battle, where real discussions have their inception. Hence contemporary theology is enmeshed in specious discussions which will soon reveal that it does not possess an adequate faith in life in the evangelical sense. The new theological thinking must become sociologically related thinking. In order to realize this, theology and the science of religion must undergo a process of reconstruction, which, proceeding from the basic thought that religion is essentially sociologically conditioned, will change the traditional conceptual apparatus and the old systematic procedures.

Dunkmann again is the first to show that according to the biblical concept religion is essentially sociologically conditioned. He posits the thesis: "In fact, only sociologically can biblical religion be fully understood"; and of the Old Testament in particular he says: "In the Old Testament the social element belongs immediately and constitutively to religion, in which objective cultic (legal), i.e. social forms and subjective inner forms, are fused without discord. And the New Testament faith is communal faith also; the Holy Spirit unites individuals into a communion. "That the social bond follows later, as modernists (C. Stange, H. Scholz, Hirsch, Barth, Gogarten, Hupfeld, Brunstaed, Brunner, not to mention the liberal theologians) hold, can nowhere be proven.

Dunkmann is right in assuming that today the sociological point of view is actually very important in the science of religion and in theology. In his religio-sociological systematics he is primarily interested in showing the importance of sociological considerations in the individual disciplines of the science of religion. He attempts to show that the science of religion cannot longer "withdraw" from sociology. This aim of Dunkmann's religio-sociological systematics displaces its center of gravity in as much as it restricts the real scope of the religio-sociological problem. Dunkmann assigns five groups of problems to the science of religion as the limits for religio-sociological consideration. These groups he assigns to the individual disciplines of the science of religion. For the five fields—philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, history of religion, psychology of religion, and history of the church and dogma—he lays down religio-sociological tenets. In the apportionment the "tenets for the religio-social structure," which really pertain more definitely to the religio-sociological field, have suffered the greatest curtailment. Yet these very tenets must be the point of departure for pure religio-sociological systematics.

Thus Dunkmann's systematic, although highly significant, does not seem to be well rounded out.

As to his tenets for the philosophy of religion I call attention only to the fact that Dunkmann sees metaphysical qualities of consciousness in the elementary self-differentiation of the autarchic group from all the "surround-

ing world," or "nature." This view gives religion a new sociological-religio-philosophical basis which is different from all other bases in that at its very outset it overcomes the individualistic concept of religion. To what extent the concept of religious revelation may be understood on this basis Dunkmann has unfortunately not been able to show adequately.

As to his tenets for the history of religion, and of the church and dogma, a twofold comment must suffice. In the first place Dunkmann shows that for a systematic sifting of the material of the history of religion a more prominent part must be given to the religio-sociological method and formation of concepts. This is in harmony with the general demand of other students of religion, who are seeking more directive categories and principles of classification for the history of religion. Dunkmann is also correct in his statement that "the many disciplines which deal with religion overlap constantly." It seems correct also that the religio-sociological point of view is better adapted than any other to gather up the divergent points of view and to introduce a new order for the systematic science of religion and of theology.

For research in the fields of church history and the history of religion religio-sociological points of view are not simply so many points of view alongside others. Rather, they are able to employ the so-called "historical method" in its application to church history and the history of religion in a very definite fashion and to make it meaningful. Dunkmann shows, e.g., that the problem of "inner-church schisms" can be fully solved neither on the basis of the traditional criteria of historical research in general, nor on the basis of an "ideological-dogmatic" or theological study of their essences. For these schisms are grounded in the specific religio-sociological modifications of the respective communions, and hence in their historical development they have meaning only as related to sociological communions. A merely "ideological-dogmatic" study of communion will not enable one to understand fully an ecclesiastic schism, because it is confined to the "definite, socially circumscribed foundation" of the schism, and thus admits its own limitations. In order that research may trace back scientifically the historical development of confessional differentiation, new principles of sociological relevancy must be added to the general historical method and to the theological-communal-sociological categories. Dunkmann intimates that only a broader concept of confessions will lead us on and beyond the "theological writing of history and criticism of dogmas." One of these new sociological factors is the race question. Merely to have called attention to this within the frame-work of a sociology of church history is highly significant. "Catholic and protestant 'Christianity' has its roots *de facto* rather in climatic, political, even racial differences, than solely in ideological, *i.e.*, in theological-rational concepts."

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Éléments de Sociologie religieuse. By Roger Bastide. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1935. 203 pp. Fr. 10, 50.

This is an extremely useful and instructive survey of recent sociological theories concerning the origin and nature of religion. It is naturally more adequate for the French literature on this subject than for the literature in other languages, but this French literature is certainly the most important in the field. After a preliminary attempt to define the sacred, the author undertakes a critical discussion of the relation between magic and religion, pointing out the failures of theories like those of Frazer to ditsinguish magic and religion in terms of their temporal origin or priority, and concluding that the distinction becomes clearer when one examines the divergent *tendencies* or *techniques* of magic and religion in their common aim of controlling nature. Religion *tends* toward sacrifice, magic toward malediction; religion *tends* toward the pious adoration of divinities, magic toward the use of impersonal mystic forces; religion *tends* toward oblations and prayers, magic toward purely mechanical efficacies; religion, toward the communion of the faithful; magic, toward individual practitioners. The author, following M. Allier, interprets this gradual divergence of the two out of their primitive state of almost indistinguishable mixture as a conflict: one or the other must triumph eventually, for they are increasingly incompatible. Magic is the objectification or sublimation of desire; religion, of will. Magic has produced neither science nor morality (certain theories to the contrary notwithstanding), and, if unchecked by religion and reason, is apt to encourage nervous disorders.

The second and third parts are more descriptive, and contain admirable brief essays on souls, myths, rites, religious institutions, and religious systems. By far the larger part of this material is taken from primitive and ancient cultures, and exhibits the close inter-relations of religion, morals, and politics in these cultures. The author then follows the conventional sociological analysis, pointing out that as society becomes increasingly differentiated the *sacred* rites and functions become the special possessions of special groups, churches. This general assumption that the religion of modern churches is something apart, something analogous to the private and secret societies of primitive cultures, and that secular society, notably the state, has therefore inherited many of the functions that made religion socially

important for primitive and ancient peoples—this positivistic assumption is probably the chief reason for the failure on the part of the author and of most French sociologists to apply to contemporary civilized religions the same insight and analyses that they have used so effectively on the primitives and ancients. One feels constantly the motif *sotto voce* that modern religions are mere survivals of primitive cultures. This curious blindness in many scientists prevents them from seeing contemporary religion against the background of contemporary society. Religion, so the inference seems to run, is no longer *in society* as it was in the beginning, it lives in "special societies" or churches which are the ghosts, so to speak, of primitive secret societies and ancient mysteries. No doubt there is enough ghostly religion abroad to make such an attitude plausible, but the open-eyed sociologist will certainly not fail to see "the domain of the sacred" as it lives today in society instead of seeing it merely as if it were enshrined in ecclesiastical museums. Even granted, for the sake of argument, that churches are museums of primitive culture, the sociologist can not forever evade the problem of why museums are cultivated as important and living social institutions.

However, to return from this homiletical digression to our author, the last part of this volume is especially valuable for its survey of recent theories regarding the origin and evolution of religion and for the bibliographical references that follow it. The wealth of genuine information here contained makes the formal "conclusions" and formalistic "laws of religious evolution" seem trite and unenlightening.

Herbert W. Schneider

Columbia University

BOOK NOTES

Thus Religion Grows: The Story of Judaism. By Rabbi Morris Goldstein. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. xiii + 358 pp. $3.00.

Rabbi Goldstein attempts in this book to present the history of the Jew in terms of a brief history of the Jewish Religion. He accepts as his definition of religion "the heroic and frequently pathetic effort of man to adjust himself to the world" (page 1), and thus broadens the conception of religion so far that the use of the term is pointless. Religion considered in terms of adjustment must necessarily involve the doctrine of progressive revelation. This Rabbi Goldstein accepts. However, Rabbi Goldstein's conception of the process in Judaism involves the belief that the progress has been unitary and organic rather than episodic and occasional. Thus he looks back upon various schismatic movements, and sees in them what rabbinical exegesis later made of them: aspects of rabbinism, rather than independent attempts, within the framework of the Jewish cultural pattern, to construct satisfactory solutions to local problems of religious and secular adjustment.

The book is not a popular survey, since an attempt is made to present ideas, and not to gloss over them, and since the author talks down neither to his readers nor about his subject. It cannot, however, be called a scholarly book, for it presents no original material, nor does it provide the necessary critical apparatus indicating the sources of the material presented. The book can best be considered as a well-written summary, from the point of view of a contemporary reform rabbi, of the work of recent historians.

The treatment is divided for convenience into three sections, detailing "How a Religion is Born: Biblical Judaism"; "How a Religion Lives On: Rabbinic Judaism"; and "How a Religion Faces the Future: Contemporary Judaism." Of these, the most satisfactory is the section which treats of Biblical Judaism, for it is here that a compressed statement of the results of the higher criticism is presented in terms of its implications in the history of Judaism. The treatment of Contemporary Judaism is, of necessity, sketchy and inconclusive, and rather more dependent upon faith than upon fact for its conclusions. The weakness of the book is revealed chiefly in the author's handling of Rabbinic Judaism, where, in the desire to support his belief in the continuous and coherent character of the changes taking place in Judaism, the author neglects to analyze the effect of the Diaspora upon the variations from the Jewish norm, and contents himself with the presentation of the norm itself, which was the theoretical, compromise position.

The didactic purpose of the book reveals itself chiefly in the concluding section, "What of the Future?" which ends on the note that "he who is

truly convinced by the amazing story of Judaism that the Jews are a people of destiny gladly takes his place in the workings of destiny" (page 334). One should be relieved to find as much of accuracy, as much of objectivity, and as much of regard for historical materials as there is in this work, considering that its stated purpose is to induce adherence to Judaism in the contemporary world.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

Cures for Minds in Distress. By RABBI MORRIS LICHTENSTEIN. New York: Jewish Science Publishing Co., 1936. 345 pp. $5.00.

A book by the leader and founder of Jewish Science which, in the words of the author, is intended "to describe the various nervous ailments to which men are prone, and to indicate the three principle methods of treatment intended to achieve a cure, namely, the medical, the psychoanalytical, and the religious." The medical method is dismissed as ineffective, and the psychoanalytical as fantastic and immoral. The religious method, consisting mainly of prayer, is claimed to be successful in various sorts of mental diseases.

M. B.

The 1937 Franciscan Almanac. Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony's Guild, 1937. 556 pp. 50 cents.

A carefully indexed volume containing an amazing amount of data of general interest to all students of Catholicism. The doctrines of the church, its liturgy, organization and history are treated in detail; its educational work, missionary activities and religious orders, and the official pronouncements of the church on such matters as capital and labor, marriage, and the motion picture, are given clear and definite exposition; and the achievements of Catholic men of letters, statesmen, scientists, etc. from the earliest times to the present, are listed in an imposing array. One of the most useful sections is a dictionary of technical terms, such as, *Ad limina visit, agrapha, attrition, cathedraticum,* etc. down the alphabet which may puzzle the lay student. Besides being useful, the Almanac is interesting reading.

M. B.

Problèmes d'Histoire des Religions. By JEAN BARUZI. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1935. viii + 151 pp. 10 fr.

This volume contains three distinct essays. The first is the author's introductory lecture in his course on the history of religions at the Collège de France, 1934, in which he reviews the careers and works of his deceased colleagues, Charles Andler and Alfred Loisy. In the second, he undertakes a critique of recent developments in *Formgeschichte.* In the third, he discusses the possibility of the influence of Islamic mystics (notably Ibn 'Abbād) on St. John of the Cross on the basis of an essay published in the

Spanish review, *Al-Andalus*, (1933), by Asín Palacios, entitled "Un Precursor hispanomusulman de San Juan de la Cruz."

H. W. S.

Die katholische Kirche und Meister Eckehart. By EDMUND MUGLER. Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1931. iv + 168 pp. RM 3.

This is the fourth volume of Dr. Mugler's analysis of the relations between Christianity and Ethics. The first part attempts to show how the Roman Catholic Church gradually buried the ethical conception of virtue under its cultic conception of "merit" and grace. The second and third parts are a commentary on Meister Eckehart, especially on his *Büchlein vom Vollkommenen Leben*, in which Dr. Mugler presents Eckehart as reasserting ethical piety on the basis of Neoplatonic philosophy.

H. W. S.

An Anthology of Mysticism. Edited by PAUL DE JAEGHER, S.J. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1935. viii + 275 pp. 7/6.

In his introduction to this collection of excerpts from the Catholic mystics Father de Jaegher tells us "Why and how the writings of the mystics should be read," and attempts to dispel the prejudice which many moderns have against them. He defines ecstasy as "the powerlessness of the body, unable to bear God's action and the delightful flame of His love." He altogether begs the question as to whether this "powerlessness" is related intrinsically, or only accidentally, to certain types of psychic abnormality—a question of great importance for the psychology of religion. Certainly the description by St. Angela of Foligno of her physical and spiritual sufferings (pp. 21 ff.) produces an effect of painful and repellent abnormality. In pleasant contrast to the neurotic Angela is the great contemplative, Blessed John Ruysbroeck, whose solid, Flemish mind retains its sober, extraverted point of view even in the midst of his mystical experiences. He avoids all taints of eroticism and pantheism, and keeps his rationality intact throughout. The selections range in time from the thirteenth century to the present day, and include passages from a number of little-known mystics. Another Flemish mystic, Anne Catherine Emmerich, in her description of a vision of the scourging of Jesus, reveals a sadistic imagination which would do credit to any pervert—a strange passage indeed to be included in a book of edification! It is the inclusion of such passages, and others of a weakly childish and sentimental nature, along with the lofty flights of the truly great, such as St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa of Avila, which make a book of this sort incomprehensible to the non-Catholic. It seems of doubtful value to lump together, with no discrimination whatever, the moronic, the neurotic, the psychopathic, and the great inspired geniuses of the spirit—all under one category. It is little to be wondered at that there is a prejudice against the very word *mysticism* in the modern world.

M. B.

The Church Edifice and its Appointments. By the Rev. HAROLD E. COLLINS. Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press, 1936. viii + 192 pp. $1.50.

To the student of religion interested in liturgics this little volume is a veritable treasure trove, though written in the most cut-and-dried manner and avowedly intended as a manual for those concerned in the practical business of building, or reconstructing a church, and not at all for the general reader. The official authorities consulted in its preparation include the *Caeremoniale Episcoporum,* the *Code of Canon Law,* the *Decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites,* the *Memorial of Rites of Benedict XII,* and the *Roman Ritual.* Every detail of the edifice and its furnishings is explicitly stated, and the exact rules to which they must conform. The laws concerning the consecration, and desecration, of churches and altars are especially interesting. A church is desecrated by criminal homicide, which includes suicide, but not by the execution of a judicial capital sentence. A church is also desecrated by being put to sordid uses, such as the stabling of horses, and by the burial of an infidel. An interesting proof of the survival of the cult of the dead is found in the rules for the consecration of an altar. "For the valid consecration of a fixed or a portable altar it is necessary to place the relics of saints in the sepulchre of the altar. These relics must be actual portions of the bodies of canonized saints. They must be also authentic. Doubtful relics may not be used. These relics must be of several saints. It is the general practice, confirmed by official decisions of the Holy See, that they should be relics of martyrs." The removal of these relics (except for purposes of inspection) constitutes a desecration of the altar. "An altar is said to be privileged when, in addition to the ordinary fruits of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, a plenary indulgence is also granted whenever Mass is celebrated thereon. An altar may be privileged for the living, or for the living and the dead."

The perusal of such a book as this should be of great value to a non-Catholic who wishes to understand the "overtones" of Catholicism, as well as the ritualistic and sacramental phases of religion in general.

M. B.

Across the Years: An Autobiography. By CHARLES STEDMAN MACFARLAND. New York: Macmillan, 1936. 367 pp. $2.75.

Perhaps we could not do better than to summarize this work in the words of the author in his introduction. "The book is published as I complete half a century of Christian institutional activity, forty-five years in the ministry, twenty-five of administrative and consultative service." During this period Dr. Macfarland has played an important part in many causes, most of which have been successful. He was prominent in the organization of the Federal Council of Churches, in the relations between American Protestants before, during, and after the World War, in the development of the present attitude of the Protestant Churches toward war and mili-

tarism, etc. There is hardly a single movement of importance in which he has not sometime been interested, and in preparing his autobiography, he has been able to present a picture of a valuable and busy life. An autobiography is not the place for argument or debate. It acquires its value from the clearness and conviction with which the author states the principles under which he has lived and in which he has believed. So it is with Dr. Macfarland. We have here the record of the life of one of the most active of American religious leaders among the liberal Protestants. He has played his part here and in the great world of politics, of statesmanship, and of diplomacy, and he has done it well. He has told it well, and if at times certain passages seem too sentimental, they are only to be read in passing. It is the record of an able and influential man, and it is to be read and admired for that. It was well worth while for Dr. Macfarland to write the story of his life, and any one who seeks to know the motives and developments of modern institutional Protestantism as seen by one of its leaders would do well to read it.

C. A. M.

The Second United Order Among the Mormons. By EDWARD J. ALLEN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936. 148 pp. $2.25.

In the first years of Mormonism its members were commanded by 'revelation' given through the prophet Joseph Smith, Jr. to establish a new economic order to be known as the United Order, or Order of Enoch. The plan of the Order was similar to those agrarian communistic experiments contemporary with it but had its own distinguishing features. Briefly stated its principles were: (1) All things belong to the Lord. (2) The Church is the proper and authorized agency for administering the Lord's possessions. (3) Permanent stewardships or inheritances should be appointed and deeded by the church to the members on the basis of equality according to family, circumstance and need. (4) All surplus property and production above the needs for a frugal livelihood to be consecrated to the church for the benefit of the poor.

Two definite attempts were made to establish the United Order. These were separated in time by about forty years. The first attempt was made in Ohio and in Missouri during the years 1831 to 1837. The second was in Utah during the years 1874 to 1885. Both of these attempts were failures. This book reviews the first United Order; traces the significant economic and social events in Mormon history during the subsequent forty year interim period; and then presents a careful study of the organization, operation and disintegration of the Second United Order, indicating its essential departures from the original plan and the reasons for its failure. This book will serve as a well documented source of information about this highly interesting second Mormon experiment in partial economic collectivism.

S. A. STOWATER

Songs from the Slums. By Toyohiko Kagawa. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1936. 96 pp. $1.00.

A collection of poems by the "modern St. Francis," interpreted by Lois Johnson Erickson, a missionary of the Southern Presbyterian Church in Japan, with an Introduction by Sherwood Eddy, and illustrations by Julian Bazelton. This little book is a poignant record of a spiritual experience of great significance for our present day. In the words of Mr. Eddy: "The forces that have made a waste of the world today are common to the Shinkawa of Kobe, the East Side of New York, and London's Bow. Kagawa is not confronting us with some far-off tragedy of another hemisphere, but one in which our own hands are red with guilt." But it is not only the horror and agony of slum life which the poet has presented to us; here we find also a great joy in the beauty of nature, in human love and companionship, and in the goodness and the power of God.

M. B.

Seven Symbols of Life. By Alan W. Watts. London: The Buddhist Lodge, 1936. 22 pp. 1/ .

"An essay on eternal verities as expressed in the images of the lotus, of water, wind, fire, man, woman and child," written from the point of view of a modern, European Buddhist.

First Adventures in Philosophy. By Vergilius Ferm. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. xi + 548 pp. $2.00.

An elementary textbook in philosophy emphasizing the various systems and problems now current. Contains a thoughtful chapter on "Religion, Theology and Philosophy."

Through Science to God. By Nathan A. Smyth. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936. vi + 213 pp. $2.00.

As a substitute for the traditional -isms of the philosophy of religion, "actualism" is here presented as a tentative and tolerant formulation of the relation between God and Man. After reviewing the commonplaces of recent developments in the philosophy of science—the repudiation of determinism, substances, and "realities," the author attempts to concentrate on scientific "actualities"—the creative cosmic stream in which man participates and thus "glorifies God," the love of the good, the beneficence of nature, and kindred themes. Religion is recognized as a pictorial language having its own specific values along with the scientific "pictures." This tolerance between religion and science, according to which no pictorial language reaches the whole or the ultimate, is the basis for philosophical "actualism."

H. W. S.

Historical Outline of the Bible. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman and Walter George Muelder. Berea, Ky.: Berea College Press, 1936. 56 pp.

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